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CRIMINOLOGY 
BEYOND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 






 & JUSTICE TANKEBE
***
 
The question of legitimacy has become an increasingly important topic 
in criminological analysis in recent years, especially in relation to policing 
and to prisons.  There is substantial empirical evidence to show the 
importance of legitimacy in achieving law-abiding behavior and 
cooperation from citizens and prisoners, especially through what has been 
described as procedural justice (that is, quality of decisionmaking 
procedures and fairness in the way citizens are personally treated by law 
enforcement officials).  Yet the dual and interactive character of legitimacy, 
which necessarily involves both power-holders and audiences, has been 
largely neglected.  This situation has arisen because criminologists have 
not fully explored the political science literature on legitimacy; hence 
adequate theorization has lagged behind empirical evidence.  The principal 
aim of this Article is therefore theoretical: we aim to advance the 
conceptual understanding of legitimacy in the contexts of policing and 
prisons, drawing on insights from wider social science literatures, but 
applying them to criminal justice contexts.  A central contention is that 
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legitimacy is dialogic, involving claims to legitimacy by power-holders and 
responses by audiences.  We conclude by exploring some broad 
implications of our analysis for future empirical studies of legitimacy in 
criminal justice contexts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The topic of legitimacy is of great theoretical and practical importance 
within the field of criminal justice, but it remains under-studied by 
criminologists and socio-legal scholars.  Unquestionably the dominant 
theoretical approach to legitimacy within these disciplines is that of 
“procedural justice,” based especially on the work of Tom Tyler.  At the 
time when he wrote his path-breaking book Why People Obey the Law, 
Tyler regarded himself as a psychologist, not a criminologist.
1
  
Nevertheless, the book has in significant ways transformed criminology, 
and for that the discipline owes him a huge debt of gratitude.
2
 
Tyler began his seminal work by contrasting instrumental and 
normative modes of obedience to law, and he then subdivided the 
normative mode into “personal morality” (that is, people’s general set of 
beliefs as to how they should act) and “legitimacy” (that is, people’s 
perception as to whether law enforcement officials rightly have authority 
over them).  Surveys were conducted of the general population, asking 
questions about their recent contacts with the police or the courts, their 
reaction to such contacts, and their subsequent behavior.  To quote the 
jacket of his book, Tyler’s principal conclusion was that “people comply 
with the law not so much because they fear punishment as because they feel 
that legal authorities are legitimate and that their actions are generally 
fair.”3  Thus, his empirical results led Tyler to prioritize normative 
compliance over instrumental compliance, and, within normative 
compliance, to emphasize legitimacy.  The final phrase of the jacket 
summary (above) also captured a further important dimension of the results: 
it was the perceived procedural fairness of law enforcement authorities, 
rather than the favorability or the perceived fairness of the outcome of the 
citizen’s encounter with them, that was particularly important in shaping 
 
1 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
2 There were important references to legitimacy in some criminological studies before 
1990.  See, e.g., ROBERT REINER, THE POLITICS OF THE POLICE pt. 1 (1st ed. 1985) (recounting 
the history of policing in Britain); BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: U.S. 
PRISON RIOTS 1971–1986, at 218–31 (1989) (analyzing prison riots in the United States).  
But legitimacy was not the central focus of these studies, and they did not have the impact on 
the discipline as a whole that Tyler’s text achieved. 
3 TYLER, supra note 1, back cover. 
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respondents’ subsequent compliance. 
Tom Tyler has followed up this initial research with an impressive 
series of further survey-based studies, including some that have used a 
panel design rather than a cross-sectional approach.  These studies have 
amplified but also confirmed the original results.
4
  Together, this corpus of 
work is rightly regarded as the most important criminological scholarship 
on legitimacy currently available.  Tyler has summarized his main theses in 
a useful diagram, reproduced here as Figure 1.
5
  In this diagram, the concept 
of procedural justice is divided into two components.  These are, first, 
whether citizens are treated fairly when law enforcement authorities make 
decisions about them (for example, by being allowed to have their say, 
without interruption or harassment, prior to a decision being made: “quality 
of decisionmaking”); and secondly, whether law enforcement officers treat 
citizens with proper respect as human beings, each with his or her own 
needs for dignity, privacy, and so on (“quality of treatment”).  Tyler 
contends that procedural fairness, if present, is more likely to lead to (1) 
immediate decision acceptance, and (2) an initial ascription of legitimacy to 
the law enforcement authority.  In the longer term, he further argues that “to 
the degree that people do regard the police and courts as legitimate, they are 
more willing to accept the directives and decisions of the police and courts, 
and the likelihood of defiance, hostility, and resistance is diminished.”6 
Most of the empirical work of Tyler and his colleagues has been 
focused on the police and the courts, and it uses survey-based methodology.  
A second strand of criminological research into legitimacy has, by contrast, 
focused on the everyday internal life of prisons.  This strand began with 
Sparks, Bottoms, and Hay’s Prisons and the Problem of Order, a primarily 
ethnographic study of two English maximum security prisons with radically 
contrasting regimes.  The authors deployed legitimacy as a central 
conceptual tool in analyzing what they describe as “the perennial problem 
of securing and maintaining order in prisons, rather than the special 
problem of the occasional complete or near-complete breakdown of order.”7 
 
4 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002); Jason Sunshine & 
Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for 
Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling 
and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police 
Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2004). 
5 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 283, 284 (2003). 
6 Id. at 286. 
7 RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 2 (1996); see also 
Richard Sparks & Anthony Bottoms, Legitimacy and Imprisonment Revisited: Some Notes 
on the Problem of Order Ten Years After, in THE CULTURE OF PRISON VIOLENCE 91 (James 
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Figure 1 




The key elements of the model are shown in the above figure.  The focus is on 
two consequences of public feelings about law and legal authorities: variations in 
willingness to accept decisions and differences in the level of general cooperation.  
Each is linked to process-based judgments of procedural justice and motive-based 
trust.  Those process-based judgments, in turn, flow from antecedent assessments 
of two procedural elements: quality of decisionmaking and the quality of 
treatment.8 
 
Subsequent studies, which have significantly advanced our 
understanding of legitimacy in the prisons context, have been conducted by 
Alison Liebling and her colleagues in the Prisons Research Unit at 
Cambridge University, using a mixture of prison-based surveys and 
ethnography.
9
  Despite the different methodological approach, these various 
studies have confirmed the importance of procedural justice as described by 
Tyler.  They have also, however, introduced to the discussion some fresh 
elements, of which two are of special importance in the present context.   
First, it has been shown that legal officials sometimes have to consider 
their legitimacy in relation to more than one audience and that these 
 
M. Byrne et al. eds., 2008). 
8 TYLER, supra note 5, at 283–85. 
9 See ALISON LIEBLING, PRISONS AND THEIR MORAL PERFORMANCE (2004); BEN CREWE, 
THE PRISONER SOCIETY (2009). 
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audiences might have significantly different priorities.
10
  In the case of 
prisons, that is of course particularly true regarding the differing priorities 
of prisoners and the general public; but analogous problems arise for the 
police in the policing of any neighborhood where different groups have 
conflicting interests. 
Secondly, prison researchers have also shown that, within the enclosed 
context of a custodial institution, perceived outcome fairness as well as 
procedural fairness can be of great importance to the achievement of staff 
legitimacy in the eyes of prisoners.
11
  This result arises especially because 
the outcomes of most incidents are widely known throughout the prison, a 
situation that is frequently not replicated in neighborhood community 
contexts. 
Prison-based research on legitimacy has therefore begun to open up 
some aspects of legitimacy and criminal justice that go beyond the 
parameters of the work on procedural justice.  A similar widening of the 
terms of the debate may be found in the Russell Sage Foundation volume 
entitled Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, edited by Tom Tyler—although 
curiously, that volume is almost wholly silent about legitimacy in prisons.
12
  
Conceptually speaking, the most important essay in that volume is that of 
David Smith, in which a central argument is that “procedural justice 
[research] work, although powerful, is limited in scope,” and that it is 
therefore necessary to take “a wider view of the issues.”13 
In our judgment, Smith is right to seek to broaden the debate in this 
way.  Yet it has to be said that neither the Russell Sage Foundation volume, 
nor the existing literature on legitimacy in prisons, takes full account of the 
rich tradition of theoretical discussions of legitimacy within the social 
sciences, especially in political science.  The most important purpose of this 
Article is therefore to offer a fuller account of how the concept of 
legitimacy might optimally be theorized within a criminal justice context, 
using these broader social science resources. 
In pursuing this agenda, we take as our starting point the introductory 




10 Alison Liebling, A ‘Liberal Regime Within a Secure Perimeter’?: Dispersal Prisons 
and Penal Practice in the Late Twentieth Century, in IDEOLOGY, CRIME AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 97, 121–28 (Anthony Bottoms & Michael Tonry eds., 2002). 
11 SPARKS ET AL., supra note 7, at 303–11. 
12 LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Tom R. Tyler ed., 2007). 
13 David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 30, 31.  
14 Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives, in 
LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 9. 
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That chapter begins by posing what are rightly described as some “larger 
conceptual questions” within which empirical studies of legitimacy must be 
conducted.  The three larger questions identified are: (1) “the definition of 
legitimacy,” (2) “the reasons legitimacy is important within a social 
system,” and (3) “what factors create and sustain legitimacy, that is, what 
forms of social organization or what dynamics of authority are viewed by 
the members of particular social groups as being appropriate and hence 
legitimate the exercise of authority.”15 
In the Russell Sage Foundation symposium, these three vital questions 
are used to delineate and differentiate the principal sections of the book; we 
have chosen to follow a similar approach by adopting them as the titles of 
three of the sections of this Article.  We also, however, include two other 
sections.  One focuses on Max Weber’s discussion of legitimacy, since this 
remains central to the field, although as will be seen we do not recommend 
a wholesale adoption of Weber’s approach.  In the concluding section, we 
shall consider—in a broad-brush manner—some implications of our 
theoretical analysis for future empirical studies of legitimacy in the field of 
criminal justice.  We regard this as an important part of the Article, and it 
serves to emphasize that we are concerned not simply with conceptual 
clarification, but also with the further advancement of empirical research in 
the field of legitimacy and criminal justice. 
II. DEFINING LEGITIMACY 
Tyler et al. follow Zelditch in characterizing authority as legitimate 
when people “believe that the decisions made and rules enacted by that 
authority or institution are in some way ‘right’ or ‘proper’ and ought to be 
followed.”16  This definition assumes that the concept of legitimacy 
principally focuses upon the reactions by citizens to the decisions and rules 
made by an authority.  Other social scientists, however, have approached 
the issue in a slightly different way and have focused on the “right to rule,” 
seen from the standpoint of both citizens and power-holders.
17
  These 
scholars therefore ask what is ultimately a more fundamental question: 
whether a power-holder is justified in claiming the right to hold power over 
other citizens (and thus to issue decisions and rules that are binding on 
 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id.; Morris Zelditch, Process of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New 
Directions, 64 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 4 (2001); see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological 
Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006). 
17 LESLIE HOLMES, THE END OF COMMUNIST POWER 39 (1993); Joseph Rothschild, 
Observations on Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe, 92 POL. SCI. Q. 487, 491 (1977). 
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them).  We believe that focusing on this more fundamental question is the 
right approach. 
Among formal definitions of legitimacy within the right to rule 
tradition, the following concise statement by Jean-Marc Coicaud has, in our 
view, much to commend it: “Legitimacy is the recognition of the right to 
govern.  In this regard, it tries to offer a solution to a fundamental political 
problem, which consists in justifying simultaneously political power and 
obedience.”18  This definition has three important features.  First, it 
emphasizes the normative character of legitimacy; that is, legitimacy is to 
be found where there is a positive recognition by citizens of the power-
holder’s moral right to exercise that power.  Secondly, the definition 
explicitly incorporates the view that discussions of legitimacy must 
embrace both those who exercise political power and those who are 
expected to obey.  Thus, legitimacy is seen as the “recognition of the right 
to govern” within a structured bilateral (or multilateral) relationship, and if 
successfully established it simultaneously justifies the actions of both the 
power-holder and the obedient subject.  Thirdly, and by implication, 
legitimacy within this definition is seen as necessarily conditional or 
defeasible.  For example, in a given context most citizens might at first 
gladly recognize a power-holder as having the right to rule.  However, if in 
time it becomes clear that the power-holder is routinely using power to 
engage in corrupt practices, it is very likely that the public’s recognition of 
his or her right to rule will be gradually withdrawn. 
As well as formally defining legitimacy, we need to contrast it with 
some other cognate conditions.  Joseph Raz has drawn attention to the fact 
that, when we use the concept of “legitimate authority,” there is an 
intermingling of the notions of both “power” and “right.”19  In a compressed 
discussion which we shall slightly elaborate, Raz goes on to suggest that we 
can usefully distinguish three kinds of persons or bodies that hold effective 
power over others and issue orders to them: these are (1) “people or groups 
who exert naked power,” (2) “de facto authorities,” and (3) “legitimate 
authorities.”20  According to Raz, the first group (exemplified by those 
cynically “terrorizing a population,” or on a smaller scale by hostage-
takers) do not claim any kind of right to rule, nor do they suggest to those 
under their power that they have any moral obligation to obey; rather, the 
power-holders simply hope and expect that they will secure an obedience 
 
18 JEAN-MARC COICAUD, LEGITIMACY AND POLITICS 10 (David Ames Curtis trans., 2002) 
(citation omitted). 
19 JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 128 (2009). 
20 Id. 
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based on a combination of physical coercion (e.g., locking people up), fear, 
or a self-interested calculation of the consequences of resistance.
21
  In short, 
this is a power relationship, pure and simple, with no element of right.  The 
second group, those exercising de facto authority, are, according to Raz, 
very different.  Those in this group are akin to the first group in being able 
to exercise effective power over citizens, but they differ in that, unlike the 
first group, they always claim legitimacy (in the sense of a right to rule).  In 
Raz’s account, it is precisely the fact that power-holders in this second 
group make claims to legitimacy that justifies us in describing them as 
authorities (that is, as those who are attempting to introduce some element 
of rightness in their exercise of power).  They are, however, only de facto 
authorities, not legitimate authorities, because they have not secured from 
their audience a recognition of their right to rule.  Finally, Raz’s third group 
consists of legitimate authorities, who, like de facto authorities, claim 
legitimacy.  The difference is that their claim is accepted, so they fulfill 
Coicaud’s requirement of “a recognition of the right to govern.”22 
Of course, empirically speaking, this threefold typology will not 
always be easy to operationalize in any given setting, because the 
boundaries between the three groups will be, in real life, inevitably 
imprecise.  Nevertheless, in our judgment the typology offers a very useful 
conceptual starting point for a social scientific analysis of legitimacy.  We 
shall, however, later suggest that the typology requires some elaboration, 
because the category of de facto authority needs to be broken into two sub-
groups. 
III. MAX WEBER ON LEGITIMACY 
The theorization of Max Weber has been and remains a central point of 
reference in the study of legitimacy.
23
  However, since Weber’s approach 
has both strengths and weaknesses, it is important to review his contribution 
carefully, highlighting in particular those features of his analysis that 
remain valuable for contemporary social scientists. 
Weber famously argued that within the modern state (which he 
described as “a compulsory organization with a territorial basis”) “the use 
of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the 
state or prescribed by it.”  Indeed, he went on, this claim “is as essential to 
[the state] as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous 
 
21 Id. 
22 COICAUD, supra note 18. 
23 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1978). 
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operation.”24  These bold observations remain valid today,25 although of 
course in some empirical contexts a given state may have difficulty in 
making its claim credible. 
Political scientists have sometimes failed to notice the full implications 
of these comments by Weber.  This is because, naturally enough, when 
political scientists have studied legitimacy their work has focused 
principally upon those holding high-level political power.  Yet, except in 
situations where it is thought necessary to deploy the army, the day-to-day 
use of legitimate force within any given state is normally reserved to law 
enforcement officials (the police, immigration officers, prison officials, 
etc.).  Given this fact, and Weber’s analysis, it follows that the study of the 
legitimacy of the work of law enforcement officials is of vital significance 
not only in a strictly criminal justice context, but also in a wider political 
context. 
It is perhaps fair to say that Weber’s principal concern, in his writings 
on legitimacy, is to explore the differences between the three different “pure 
types of legitimate domination” that he identified, namely those based on 
traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational grounds.
26
  In this Article, we are 
not concerned with the details of Weber’s threefold typology, but since this 
typology is focused on the concept of legitimate domination, it is important 
to clarify what he means by this term.  “Domination” (“Herrschaft”)27 is 
 
24 Id. at 56. 
25 It might be argued that this claim has now been falsified by two more recent social 
developments.  First, in many countries certain law enforcement functions, such as the 
management of some prisons, have now been delegated to private companies.  However, 
Weber’s claim was not, as Smith asserts, that the state “has a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force,” Smith, supra note 13, at 36; rather, Weber stated that force is legitimate only if it 
is permitted or prescribed by the state.  When the running of a prison is contracted out to a 
private company, the state continues to claim the right to determine under what 
circumstances the employees of that company may use legitimate force, just as the state has 
always claimed the right to decide when private citizens may use legitimate force (for 
example, in self-defense).  Secondly, in many countries (most obviously in Europe, given the 
existence of the European Union and the European Convention of Human Rights), states 
have now, through treaties, granted some law-making powers to international organizations.  
This is of course a limitation on state powers, but states have incurred these obligations only 
because they chose to do so, and (in principle at least) withdrawal from the obligation always 
remains an option for an individual territorial state. 
26 WEBER, supra note 23, at 215. 
27 “Herrschaft” is a central concept in Weber’s political thought.  Lassman points out 
that this term defies easy translation into English, and in discussions of Weber’s work it has 
variously been translated as “domination,” “rule,” “authority,” “leadership,” and even as 
“imperative coordination.”  Peter Lassman, The Rule of Man over Man: Politics, Power and 
Legitimation, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 83, 86 (Stephen Turner ed., 2000).  
Lassman himself prefers “rule,” id. at 89, but we have followed the lead of the translators of 
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defined by Weber as “the probability that a command with a given specific 
content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”28  Thus, the empirical 
fact of obedience is fundamental to his analysis.  But, from the point of 
view of the person or body issuing the command, how is such obedience to 
be secured?  In a passage of great significance, Weber comments as 
follows: 
Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the 
appeal to [citizens’] material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its 
continuance.  In addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the 
belief in its legitimacy.
29
 
The first sentence of this quotation perhaps requires further 
explanation.  What Weber is saying is that, as a matter of empirical 
observation, those in a position to issue commands (power-holders) do not 
simply anticipate that citizens will obey them—whether that obedience 
stems from (1) “material motives” (i.e., self-interest), (2) an emotional 
(“affectual”) affinity with the power-holder, or (3) “ideal motives” (i.e., 
philosophical or religious beliefs according to which citizens consider that 
it is their duty to obey).  Citizens may be motivated to obey by one or more 
of these considerations, but, according to Weber, in addition to any such 
matters, in seeking to secure continuing obedience a power-holder always 
“attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in [his or her] legitimacy.”30  
In other words, for Weber, claims to legitimacy by political power-holders 
are empirically universal, and they are also ongoing (power-holders attempt 
“to establish and to cultivate” legitimacy on a continuing basis). 
Interestingly, the analysis of Joseph Raz, discussed above, is highly 
congruent with that of Weber.  Raz is a moral and legal philosopher, and for 
that reason he appears to be unaware of Weber’s sociological work.31  
Nevertheless, it will be observed that his threefold classification of power-
holding (discussed in the previous section) asserts that only those exercising 
“naked power” make no attempt to claim legitimate authority; and, of 
course, hardly any (if any) political regimes would wish to describe 
themselves as exercising naked power. 
The Weber–Raz view that virtually all political regimes claim to be 
legitimate, and Weber’s further emphasis on the cultivation of legitimacy, 
 
Economy and Society in using “domination.”  See WEBER, supra note 23. 
28 WEBER, supra note 23, at 53; see id. at 946. 
29 Id. at 213 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. 
31 Weber is not cited anywhere in either of Raz’s principal works on political authority.  
See RAZ, supra note 19, ch. 5; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM pt. I (1986). 
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are of very great—and insufficiently appreciated—significance for the 
social scientific analysis of legitimacy.
32
  Why is this so?  Essentially, 
because the language of “claim” implies that power-holders are addressing 
one or more audience(s), and the language of “cultivation” implies that 
there is some kind of continuing relationship between the power-holder and 
the audience(s).  Neither Weber nor Raz develops these insights, but to us 
the consequences seem clear: legitimacy needs to be perceived as always 
dialogic and relational in character.  That is to say, those in power (or 
seeking power) in a given context make a claim to be the legitimate ruler(s); 
then members of the audience respond to this claim; the power-holder 
might adjust the nature of the claim in light of the audience’s response; and 
this process repeats itself.  It follows that legitimacy should not be viewed 
as a single transaction; it is more like a perpetual discussion, in which the 
content of power-holders’ later claims will be affected by the nature of the 
audience response.  In what follows, we shall often return to this iterative 
process of claim and response. 
Weber formally defines legitimacy as “the probability that to a relevant 
degree the appropriate attitudes [i.e., acceptance of the validity of the 
power-holder’s claim to be a valid authority] will exist, and the 
corresponding practical conduct [i.e., obedience] ensue.”33  He adds that in 
contemporary societies, where the legal-rational type of legitimate 
domination normally holds sway, “the most common form of legitimacy is 
the belief in legality, the compliance with enactments which are formally 
correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner.”34  He insists 
that “the merely external fact of the order being obeyed is not sufficient to 
signify [legitimate] domination in our sense,” because it is also essential 
that “the command is accepted as a ‘valid’ norm.”35  But, more 
surprisingly, in Weber’s analysis the concept of legitimate domination does 
not require that citizens’ acceptance of the validity of the power-holder’s 
claims to legitimacy, nor any subsequent acts of obedience, must be 
 
32 Kenneth Himma argues against what he takes to be Raz’s view that “a claim to 
authority is a conceptually necessary condition for a legal system to exist,” although he notes 
it is “empirically improbable” that many legal systems will fail to make such claims.  
Kenneth Einar Himma, Law’s Claim of Legitimate Authority, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 271, 
300 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (emphasis added).  From the point of view of a social 
scientific analysis, it is not necessary to debate this issue; it makes little difference to such an 
analysis whether claims to legitimacy by political power-holders are universal or nearly 
universal. 
33 WEBER, supra note 23, at 214. 
34 Id. at 37. 
35 Id. at 946 (emphasis added). 
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“primarily (or even at all) oriented to [the belief in legitimacy].”36  Within 
his definition of legitimacy, he is, therefore, willing to accept that some 
citizens might have accepted the power-holder’s claims to validity, and then 
obeyed the law, for a variety of non-normative reasons, such as “material 
self-interest” or “weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable 
alternative.”37 
Given the above, it has been truly said that for Weber legitimate 
domination in modern societies is, ultimately, “simply . . . a successful 
claim [by a ruler], in a world of permanent political ‘struggle.’  [It] is, in 
effect, defined in terms of legality, with the proviso that the laws must in 
fact usually be obeyed.”38  In other words, legitimate domination is, for 
Weber, simply “obeyed legality” (where “legality” includes acceptance of 
the power-holder’s claim to be a valid authority).  It follows that, in the 
language of Raz’s threefold typology, the existence of de facto authority is 
for Weber a sufficient ground to speak of a political regime as exercising 
legitimate domination, provided that the citizens regard the ruler’s 
commands as minimally “valid.” 
This approach is, in our view, very unsatisfactory, because it leaves the 
social scientist without any adequate means of distinguishing between 




Despite this serious analytic limitation, Weber’s 
claim/response/cultivation conception of legitimacy is, in our view, of 
decisive significance for contemporary social scientific analyses.  It is 
unfortunate that Weber did not fully develop the necessarily interactive 
dimensions of this approach, but his framework provides contemporary 
social scientists, including criminologists, with a most valuable conceptual 
tool. 
We cannot leave Weber’s work without some discussion of the 
importance, within his work, of the so-called fact–value distinction.  In 
common with many other social scientists, both in his day and now, Weber 
insisted that scholars must sharply differentiate between statements that 
purport to describe or explain some aspect of the world (often described as 
“is statements” or “facts”) and statements that in one way or another 
address questions of the kind “How shall I live my life?” and “What is 
justice?” (described as “ought statements” or “values” because they focus 
 
36 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
38 Lassman, supra note 27, at 88. 
39 See infra Part IV.A.5. 
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on how individuals, institutions, or governments ought to behave).  But 
where do the values in ought statements come from?  According to Weber’s 
methodological writings, we simply invent them.  Thus, as Kronman has 
explained, for Weber “the legitimacy of every binding norm, [can be traced] 
back to its deliberate enactment—its imposition, by human beings, on an 
otherwise morally neutral world.”40  If one adheres to this radically 
contingent view of ethics and political values, two implications follow.  
First, “there are no matters of fact in the world to which [ethical] 
statements . . . correspond,”41 and therefore humans can “invent” any kind 
of ethics or political system that they wish.  Second, there are no rational 
grounds for preferring one form of authority (say, democracy) to another 
(say, dictatorship)—or indeed one way of life to another.  (Philosophically, 
these positions are known respectively as “subjectivism” and “relativism.”)  
In the early twentieth century, Weber was by no means alone in holding 
such views,
42
 and indeed they continued to hold sway in one form or 
another for many decades.  For example, Mary Warnock has recalled that, 
in British philosophical teaching in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there 
was “an endless attempt to avoid . . . the [so-called] Naturalistic Fallacy,” 
that is, the alleged fallacy of “deriving evaluations from descriptions” or 
value statements from factual statements.
43
  Indeed, Warnock continues, 
such emphasis was placed on this issue that students “must sometimes have 
come to believe that [the Naturalistic Fallacy] was the only serious issue in 
moral philosophy.”44 
The fact–value distinction is directly related to some modern 
scholarship in the field of legitimacy.  In particular, Wilfried Hinsch has 
recently emphasized the importance of distinguishing “clearly between two 
different concepts of legitimacy: the empirical concept of the social 
sciences and the normative concept of political philosophy”; he further 
claims that “[p]olitical commentators are prone to vacillate” between the 
two.
45
  For Hinsch, the theoretical basis of the empirical concept—which 
derives ultimately from Weber—is that “a norm or an institutional 
arrangement is legitimate if, as a matter of fact, it finds the approval of 
 
40 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 53 (1983). 
41 ROBERT KANE, ETHICS AND THE QUEST FOR WISDOM 65 (2010). 
42 See, e.g., ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936). 
43 Mary Warnock, The Resurrection of Ethics, in WOMEN OF IDEAS 9, 26 (Anita 
Avramides ed., 1995). 
44 Id. 
45 Wilfried Hinsch, Justice, Legitimacy, and Constitutional Rights, 13 CRITICAL REV. OF 
INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 39, 40 (2010). 
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those who are supposed to live in this group.”46  It therefore follows that it 
is possible for a given political or criminal justice institution to be 
simultaneously legitimate yet also, in the eyes of a given observer, highly 
unjust.
47
  By contrast, Hinsch identifies two central features of the 
normative concept of legitimacy: it “involves ‘objective’ [normative] 
criteria of legitimacy that are alien to Weber’s empirical concept” (and to 
his subjectivist and relativist understanding of normative discourse); and, in 
consequence, anyone who claims that a given set of power arrangements is 
normatively legitimate necessarily commits herself to the view that the 
regime has a degree of “moral standing.”48 
We shall return in Part V.A to the question whether “objective” 
normative criteria can be identified.  For the most part, however, in this 
Article we will work with the empirical concept of legitimacy, while 
recognizing that what Hinsch describes as the normative concept cannot be 
left aside. 
IV. WHAT FACTORS CREATE AND SUSTAIN LEGITIMACY? 
We turn now to another of the conceptual questions raised by Tyler et 
al. in their introduction to the Russell Sage Foundation volume, namely, 
“what creates, sustains, or undermines legitimacy?”49  This is perhaps the 
most searching of the three questions posed by these authors, and we shall 
devote considerable space to it. 
Tyler and his colleagues answer the question by reference only to 
studies of what might be described as “audience legitimacy”; but, in view of 
the preceding analysis, it seems essential that the perspectives of both the 
audience(s) and the power-holder are considered.  We shall discuss these 
separately, whilst always also bearing in mind that they function within an 
ongoing dialogic relationship. 
A. AUDIENCE LEGITIMACY 
It is a remarkable fact that two of the leading social science writers on 
legitimacy, David Beetham and Jean-Marc Coicaud, each independently 
developed the same threefold conceptualization of the central components 
of legitimacy from the perspective of audiences.
50
  For both these authors, 
 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 41. 
48 Id. at 41–42. 
49 Tyler et al., supra note 14, at 11. 
50 DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991); COICAUD, supra note 18.  
Beetham’s analysis was published first, in 1991.  Coicaud’s treatise was originally written 
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analyses of the dimensions of legality, shared values, and consent are 
crucial to the study of legitimacy; Beetham’s helpful diagrammatic 
representation of these three elements is shown in Figure 2.  Beetham 
explicitly argues that this conceptual framework captures “an underlying 
structure of [audience] legitimacy common to all societies, however much 
its content will vary from one to the other.”51  The boldness of this claim is 
worth attention.  What is being asserted is that societies as different from 
one another as, say, Brazil, Japan, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United States all share the same underlying structure of legitimacy, despite 
their obvious social-structural and cultural differences. 
 
Figure 2 
Beetham’s Three Dimensions of Legitimacy52 
 
Criteria of legitimacy Corresponding form of 
non-legitimate power 
 
1. Conformity to Rules (legal 
validity) 
1. Illegitimacy (breach of rules) 
2. Justifiability of rules in terms 
of shared beliefs 
2. Legitimacy deficit 
(discrepancy between rules 
and supporting shared beliefs, 
absence of shared beliefs) 
3. Legitimation through 
expressed consent 




We shall utilize the Beetham–Coicaud conceptual scheme as the 
framework for our discussion, examining issues relating to the three 
components, with special reference to criminal justice.  Throughout, we 
shall for simplicity use the generic term “audience legitimacy,” but it must 
be borne in mind (see earlier discussion) that very often a power-holder 
must, in the quest for legitimacy, simultaneously address two or more 
 
and published in French in 1997; at the time, he was unaware of Beetham’s work. 
51 BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 22. 
52 Id. at 20. 






As Figure 2 shows, “consent” is the third of the three elements of 
audience legitimacy as described by Beetham.  However, like Coicaud, we 
have chosen to consider it first, because—as we hope will become clear—it 
is in some ways foundational.
54
  Our account of consent will draw on 




For Coicaud, consent is constitutive of legitimate authority: “[t]he 
identification of power with right endures [only] so long as [true normative] 
consent exists.  If consent be withdrawn, that is the sign of a lack of 
political legitimacy.”56  In the same passage, Coicaud also quotes Hannah 
Arendt’s interesting view on the use of force by power-holders: “Authority 
precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, 
authority itself has failed . . . .  The authoritarian relation between the one 
who commands and the one who obeys rests . . . on . . . the hierarchy itself, 
whose rightness and legitimacy both recognise.”57 
Many police officers and prison officers will immediately recognize 
the existential truth of the remark that “where force is used, authority itself 
has failed.”  Although they all do sometimes use force (and the rightness of 
such actions is usually accepted by most citizens), most of them would 
prefer to carry out their duties without force.  Consequently, in many police 
services, the desirability of what is interestingly called “policing by 
consent” has become a standard part of the vocabulary.58  It is precisely this 
point that Coicaud is addressing in insisting that consent is constitutive of 
legitimacy.  The point carries within it, however, an interesting apparent 
paradox.  In Weber’s analysis, the state claims a monopoly in prescribing or 
permitting the legitimate use of force; and force, where it is legitimately 
used, will often be exercised by criminal justice officials.
59
  Yet wise states 
do not encourage the use of force by their officials.  Instead, they insist that 
force be used sparingly and minimally by these officials, recognizing that 
where force is used, consensual authority has failed. 
 
53 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
54 COICAUD, supra note 18. 
55 See RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 31. 
56 COICAUD, supra note 18, at 14. 
57 Id. at 13 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 93 (4th ed.1983)). 
58 ROBERT REINER, THE POLITICS OF THE POLICE 68–71 (4th ed. 2010). 
59 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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Raz’s complex account of justified political authority includes two 
observations about consent that in our view are of special importance.
60
  
First, he claims that where true normative consent is given by a citizen to 
the legitimacy of a reasonably just state, that action is preemptive.  That is 
to say, by giving consent, the citizen (in the normal case) agrees in advance 
to treat the appropriately enacted laws and the appropriately formulated 
orders of that state as superseding and replacing one’s own judgment.61  
This topic raises difficult philosophical issues that are outside the scope of 
this Article.  However, from a social scientific viewpoint, the observation is 
important because it accurately describes the way in which some citizens 
regard authority in their society.  Empirically, however, there is a 
difficulty—to which we will return—in ascertaining whether the consent is 
true normative consent or something less than that (for example, strategic or 
pragmatic consent by people with little power). 
Raz’s second significant observation is that, in appropriate social 
circumstances, any act of true consent (including consent in non-
governmental contexts, such as consenting to a surgical procedure) itself 
purports to change the normative situation between the parties.
62
  
Moreover, and specifically with respect to consent to the authority of the 
state, Raz states that such consent, being preemptive but also normative, 
cannot be regarded as a “one-off act of identification.”  Rather, “[s]ince it 
gives one an additional reason to respect authoritative directives it affects 
all one’s encounters with authority . . . [including] one’s reasons and the 
significance of one’s actions.”  Indeed, “[i]nasmuch as they are motivated 
by one’s consent [actions] become, in a small undramatic way, an 
expression of one’s attitude to one’s society.”63  Raz, therefore, rightly 
locates consent within the ongoing flow of social relationships, including 
relationships with authorities.  Furthermore, by implication he makes clear 
that there is no sharp divide between the cognitive and the action 
dimensions of consent; the two are intimately interconnected. 
In contrast with Raz’s analysis, Beetham’s account of consent within 
processes of legitimation tends to overstate the distinction between belief 
and action.
64
  Despite this, Beetham’s comments on the importance of 
actions within processes of legitimation are particularly illuminating.  For 
him: 
 
60 See RAZ, supra note 19; RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 31. 
61 RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 31, at 57–62, 93. 
62 See RAZ, supra note 19, at 84. 
63 Id. at 94. 
64 BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 91. 
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what is important for legitimacy is evidence of consent expressed through actions 
which are understood as demonstrating consent within the conventions of the 
particular society, such as: concluding an agreement or entering into a contract with a 
superior party; swearing an oath of allegiance; joining in acclamation; voting in an 
election or plebiscite; and so on.
65
 
This point can usefully be elaborated using Beetham’s example of 
voting.  Suppose that M lives in a town that has for the last half-century 
elected to the national legislature a candidate of Party X.  M supports Party 
Y, the other principal party active in that state.  She considers it extremely 
unlikely that the town will stop supporting Party X this year, and the local 
opinion polls support her in this belief.  Nevertheless, M goes to vote for 
the candidate of Party Y, who duly loses.  Has M wasted her time?  On 
Beetham’s analysis, the answer is emphatically “no,” because regardless of 
the result, M’s action has affirmed the importance, within a democracy, of 
the elective process.  M has, therefore, by her action in voting, helped to 
legitimate elective democracy within her state. 
One can usefully develop this point theoretically in terms of the 
reproduction of social structures—as exemplified, for instance, in 
Giddens’s “structuration theory.”66  Giddens conceives of structures as rules 
and resources, which serve as “both means and outcome—means in the 
sense that the subject uses rules and resources in order to act and interact; 
outcome in the sense that it is via their use/instantiation that structures are 
reproduced.”67  Thus, actions expressive of consent serve to reproduce and 
reinforce the legitimacy of a given set of social arrangements.  In the 
context of criminal justice, citizens’ active engagement with the local 
police—for example, by offering information in relation to a specific case, 
or in participating in a consultation on local policing priorities—can be seen 
to function in a similar way.  Indeed, the idea that active engagement with 
criminal justice systems reproduces or affirms the legitimacy of those 
systems is a central feature of Ellmann’s analysis of the use of the courts by 
black Africans under the apartheid regime in South Africa.
68
  His analysis 
shows that many black Africans resorted to the courts to make claims for 
their civil liberties, even when the state attempted to deny such rights 
entitlements.  Ellmann concludes that the recurrent recourse to judicial 
settlement of disputes inevitably lent to the courts “a measure of 
legitimacy,” even though the broader system of apartheid within which the 
 
65 Id. at 12. 
66 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (1984). 
67 NICOS MOUZELIS, MODERN AND POSTMODERN SOCIAL THEORY 116 (2008). 
68 Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 407 
(1995). 
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courts were operating was naturally viewed as deeply immoral by the black 




We turn now to the other two main elements within the Beetham–
Coicaud analysis of audience legitimacy, namely legality and shared values.  
Neither of these is constitutive of legitimacy in the way that consent is, but 
both are of considerable importance as independent variables seemingly 
influencing audience legitimacy.  Indeed, it has been noted that both 
legality and shared values are “[t]wo fundamental concepts [that] figure 
prominently and persistently in the history of the problem of political 
legitimacy.”70 
Beetham asserts that “[p]ower can be said to be legitimate in the first 
instance if it is acquired and exercised in accordance with established 
rules.”71  These rules may be formal legal enactments or decisions, or 
established unwritten conventions.  Similar comments have been made in 
criminal justice contexts; for example, David Dixon has emphasized that “a 
central tenet of the police claim to legitimacy is their subordination to 
law.”72  Thus, police claims to legitimacy are intimately linked to “the rule 
of law,” which is of course a key concept within democratic theory.73 
Dixon’s comment uses the language of the power-holder side of the 
claim–response dialogue, but he is primarily concerned with the importance 
of issues of legality or illegality to the perceptions of police legitimacy by 
citizens.  In this latter connection, it is important to note the contrast, within 
Beetham’s conceptual scheme (Figure 2), between what he calls the 
“criteria of legitimacy” and the “forms of non-legitimate power.”74  This 
contrast calls to mind Aristotle’s comment, in the Nicomachean Ethics, that 
“[o]ften one of a pair of contrary states is recognized from the other 
contrary”; hence, for example, we can learn a good deal about justice from 
studying instances of injustice, and vice-versa.
75
  Pursuing this idea of 
studying opposites, one can argue that, in assessing the legitimacy of a 
given police or prison service, one can quickly appreciate the importance of 
 
69 Id. at 409–10. 
70 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United 
Nations, 20 INT’L ORG. 367, 368 (1966). 
71 BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 16 (emphasis added). 
72 DAVID DIXON, LAW IN POLICING 1–2 (1997) (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 2; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004). 
74 BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 20. 
75 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 116–17 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985); see also J. R. 
LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 4 (1980). 
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legality by considering how blatant illegality can diminish perceived 
legitimacy.  Examples of this include overt police corruption in everyday 
dealings with citizens (for example, demanding payment from motorists to 
proceed after a road block), or cases such as those of Rodney King and 
Malice Green, where police officers were shown to have repeatedly kicked 
and punched citizens.
76
  Not surprisingly, survey-based studies have shown 
that such obvious illegalities seriously undermine the legitimacy of the 
police among citizens.
77
  In a not dissimilar way, in his influential research 
study in a Norwegian prison, Thomas Mathiesen showed that one way in 
which seemingly powerless prisoners attempted to assert themselves against 
the prison authorities was to criticize them for not following the prison 
rules.
78
  By doing this, they, in effect, accused the authorities of betraying 
the principles on which their authority was supposed to rest. 
These observations link with some comments about consent in the 
previous subsection.  There, it was noted that true consent to a legal system 
amounts to “advance self-preemption” by the citizen.  If this is an accurate 
characterization, it is easy to see that citizens who have deliberately chosen 
the path of obedience might well be resentful if and when they observe a 
blatant lack of obedience to law, or an absence of self-restraint, on the part 
of those who have claimed legitimate authority. 
Despite these clear links between illegality and lack of legitimacy, it is 
paradoxically the case—as both police and prison studies show—that the 
full enforcement of the law, or the prison rules, can sometimes fail to 
enhance legitimacy; indeed, it can even lead to a degree of delegitimation.  
Thirty years ago, this point was shrewdly noted by a senior English judge, 
Lord Scarman, in an official report on urban disorders in Brixton, an area of 
London with a significant ethnic minority population.
79
  In that instance, an 
intensive police “stop and search” operation (Operation Swamp ’81), 
mounted because of an increase in street crime in the neighborhood, was in 
practice targeted disproportionately at young black males, a fact that caused 
 
76 Lee Sigelman et al., Police Brutality and Public Perceptions of Racial Discrimination: 
A Tale of Two Beatings, 50 POL. RES. Q. 777, 777–78 (1997). 
77 See generally Theodore P. Gerber & Sarah E. Mendelson, Public Experiences of 
Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing?, 42 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2008); Justice Tankebe, Public Confidence in the Police: Testing the 
Effects of Public Experiences of Police Corruption in Ghana, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 296–
319 (2010). 
78 THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE DEFENCES OF THE WEAK 23 (1965). 
79 LORD SCARMAN, THE BRIXTON DISORDERS 10–12 APRIL 1981, CMND. 8427, paras. 1.1–
1.7 (reprt. 1986).  
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widespread anger among the black community.
80
  It is clear that the police’s 
motive in intensifying the stop and search operation was to reduce crime.  
Nevertheless, against a background of suspicion between the police and the 
black community, Operation Swamp was seen as manifestly partial and 
unjust, a fact that destabilized local order.
81
  Scarman was led to comment 
that: 
Law enforcement, involving as it must, the possibility that force may have to be used, 
can cause acute friction and division in a community— particularly if the community 
is tense and the cause of the law-breaker not without support.  ‘Fiat justitia, ruat 
caelum’
82
 may be apt for a Judge: but it can lead a policeman into tactics disruptive of 
the very fabric of society . . . .  The successful solution of the conflict [between law 
enforcement and public tranquility] lies first in the priority to be given in the last 
resort to the maintenance of public order, and secondly in the constant and common-
sense exercise of police discretion.
83
 
Criminal justice professionals and politicians often use, without much 
thought, the generic phrase “law and order.”  But in the above passage, 
Scarman explicitly separates “law” from “order,” and points to the truth 
that the full enforcement of the law can in some circumstances lead to 
disorder, especially where “the community is tense and the cause of the 
law-breaker not without support.”84  Thus, in the situation Scarman was 
commissioned to examine, resentment and defiance had quickly escalated.
85
  
Scarman claims, rightly in our view, that in circumstances where, within a 
given community, one has to choose between law enforcement and the 
maintenance of public order, the latter must usually be the correct 
normative choice.
86
  That is because, in such circumstances, assertive 
enforcement of the letter of the law would lead to a significant degree of 
police delegitimation.  Hence, before long the police would not be regarded 
as holding the right to govern. 
The above comments, however, are subject to an important caveat, 
which arises from experience in certain prisons.  It is undoubtedly the case 
that a Scarman-style analysis is often valid in the prisons context; indeed, 
one of the classic texts of prison sociology proffered an argument very 
 
80 Id. paras. 4.37–4.40. 
81 Id. paras. 4.47–4.49. 
82 “Let justice be done, even if the sky collapses in consequence.” 
83 SCARMAN, supra note 79, paras. 4.57–4.58. 
84 Id. 
85 Id., pt. III; see also Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A 
Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993) (noting that 
defiance presupposes a legitimacy deficit). 
86 SCARMAN, supra note 79, paras. 4.57–4.58. 
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similar to Scarman’s half a century ago.87  But experience has shown that 
there are also conditions where other considerations apply.  Particularly in 
high security prisons, prison officers are sometimes required to guard 
sophisticated and well-disciplined groups (such as professional criminals or 
members of a paramilitary organization) who are able to organize concerted 
campaigns to try to obtain concessions in the enforcement of rules.  If, in 
such situations, the officers were to follow Scarman’s advice in always 
prioritizing “order” in preference to rule-enforcement, they would find 
themselves in a process of continual retreat, always backing down in the 
face of organized prisoner demands.  Clearly, this is not an appropriate way 
to manage a prison,
88
 a fact that has led prison scholars to draw an 
important distinction between good officer–prisoner relationships (based 
simply on superficially friendly day-to-day contact) and right relationships 
(where relationships are good, but also based on appropriate rule 
enforcement).
89
  We shall return to the significance of this distinction in 
Part V.A. 
 
87 Gresham Sykes argues that the prison is inherently an “authoritarian community” and 
that in extreme situations (riots, etc.), ultimate victory will always go to the prison 
administration, backed if necessary by the police and armed forces.  GRESHAM M. SYKES, 
THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 81, 113 (1958).  On a day-to-day basis, however, staff are 
outnumbered by inmates, and they need to accomplish various daily “housekeeping” tasks, 
such as getting prisoners to workshops, keeping the wing clean, etc.  Id. at 25–30.  Hence, in 
practice, staff negotiate a series of accommodations with prisoners in order to maintain a 
reasonable and functioning social order.  Id. at 54–58.  In consequence, although prison 
officers are by law granted massive powers over the inmates, in practice they usually make 
no attempt to enforce all the rules and focus on maintaining good order rather than on the 
letter of the law.  Id. 
88 Precisely this process occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in The Maze prison in Northern 
Ireland, as Republican paramilitary prisoners successfully made demand after demand for 
alterations to the regime in pursuit of their aim to secure recognition of the fact (as they saw 
it) that they were “prisoners of war” and entitled to the sort of conditions accorded to 
prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions—including having each living unit under the 
command of one of their own officers.  Prison officials made extensive concessions to the 
prisoners in part because of broader political developments in the wider society, and in part 
because of continual pressurization of staff by prisoners.  KIERAN MCEVOY, PARAMILITARY 
IMPRISONMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2001).  A recent official report explained the latter 
point: “The Inquiry heard of many examples of different types of pressure on staff which 
resulted in their being conditioned.  On the occasions that staff went onto the wings they 
were often seen surrounded by prisoners.  In such circumstances prisoners might make 
oblique or even direct references to an officer’s family or domestic situation.”  LORD 
MACLEAN, THE BILLY WRIGHT INQUIRY para. 7.221 (2010).  Prisoners obtained such 
information from paramilitary colleagues outside the prison and sometimes made implied 
threats of action against the officers’ families.  Personal conversation with officers in The 
Maze. 
89 See ALISON LIEBLING ET AL., THE PRISON OFFICER 92 (2d ed. 2011). 
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Overall, the analysis in this Section has shown that legality is an 
important component of audience legitimacy.  However, law always 
operates in a social context, so it must always be considered in relation to 
community values—a subject to which we must now turn. 
3. Shared Beliefs and Values: General Values 
The Beetham–Coicaud legitimacy structure suggests that, to be 
legitimate, power-holders must derive their authority from and act within 
the shared beliefs and values of a given society.  For the purpose of our 
discussion, “values” may be defined simply as “those moral beliefs to 
which people [appeal] for the ultimate rationales of action.”90  As Coicaud 
points out, values become institutionalized within what Talcott Parsons 
called “action systems,”91 and, while only a small portion of the culture and 
action system of a given society is decisive for its core identity, “this 
fraction relates to essential values and basic institutions, which are the 
object of a consensus that lies beyond discussion and that has a type of 
validity that is foundational.”92  Such “core values” are central to an 
understanding of this third element of audience legitimacy. 
A useful way in which to approach the topic of shared values is 
through Beetham’s critique of Weber.  Weber’s analysis includes, as one of 
its constituent features, the view that power relationships are legitimate if 
people believe in them as being valid.
93
  But Beetham objects to such an 
approach because it 
leaves the social scientist with no adequate means of explaining why people 
acknowledge the legitimacy of power at one time or place and not another.  The social 
scientist, it seems, is someone who must always be taken by surprise when people 
stop treating power as legitimate and take to the streets in protest.
94
 
Thus, for Beetham, a power-holder is not legitimate in the eyes of an 
audience simply because the audience “believes in” the power-holder’s 
legitimacy.  Rather, “power is legitimate to the extent that the rules of 
power can be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and 
subordinate.”95  Thus, for Beetham, and later for Coicaud, shared values do 
 
90 James L. Spates, The Sociology of Values, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 27, 28 (1983). 
91 TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM ch. I (1951). 
92 COICAUD, supra note 18, at 16. 
93 See supra Part III. 
94 BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 10. 
95 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  For Beetham, the identification of legality as one of the 
three components of audience legitimacy also provides a further argument against Weber’s 
equation of legitimacy with “belief in legitimacy,” since “whether power is or is not acquired 
and exercised within the law is a question quite independent of people’s beliefs.”  Id. at 12. 
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indeed, like legality, constitute one of the core “factors that create and 
sustain legitimacy.”96  In more detail, it can be argued that, to be fully 
legitimate according to the test of shared values, three separate tests must be 
passed: (1) any given exercise of power must be derived from a valid 
source of legitimate authority within that society, (2) the power should be 
exercised in a manner that is considered justified in the context of that 
society, and (3) the exercise of the power must be seen to serve a 
recognizable general interest, rather than simply the interests of the power-
holder.
97
  Shared values therefore set limits that define the conditions within 
which legitimate power may be exercised (negative effects), as well as 
furnishing those who govern with rules and resources within which they 
can seek to realize certain societal objectives (positive effects).  Where an 
authority figure fails to act in accordance with shared values, he or she may 
be justly singled out for censure.
98
 
The concept of shared values does, however, have its considerable 
complexities.  Three relevant difficulties of different types will be briefly 
noted here.  First, suppose that a given society has a set of strongly and 
consensually held values, but that because of political disturbances or 
economic crises in nearby countries, it experiences a relatively sudden 
influx of several separate sets of migrants, each with core values different 
from one another and from the host country.  What is now a “shared value” 
within that society?  Issues of this kind can present real dilemmas for law 
enforcement agencies, as Thorsten Sellin’s “culture conflict” thesis99 
demonstrated in the United States before the Second World War and as is 
ever more evident in the contemporary era of globalization.  This topic 
would merit a full paper to itself, but briefly, we think that a very useful 
resource in this type of situation is Michael Walzer’s distinction between 
 
96 Tyler et al., supra note 14, at 10. 
97 Adapted from BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 16–18. 
98 MATHIESEN, supra note 78, at 12.  In his Norwegian prison study, Mathiesen developed 
the concept of “censoriousness” to refer to prisoners’ frequent criticisms of their captivity 
conditions.  Id.  Interestingly, Mathiesen distinguished two subtypes of censoriousness—one 
based on legality (the prison staff were not following their own rules) and one based on 
fairness (the prison staff were acting unfairly, according to the accepted standards of 
Norwegian society).  Id. at 13–14.  The parallel with the “legality” and “shared values” 
components of the Beetham–Coicaud legitimacy structure is, clearly, very close.  There is 
also more ancient authority: according to Aristotle, the “just will be both what is lawful and 
what is fair, and [the] unjust will be both what is lawless and what is unfair.”  ARISTOTLE, 
supra note 75, at 117. 
99 Thorsten Sellin, Culture Conflict and Crime, 44 AM. J. SOC. 97, 97–98 (1938). 
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“thick” and “thin” moralities.100  According to Walzer, a thick moral 
argument is something that communities adopt as “a way of talking among 
ourselves, here at home, about the thickness of our own history and 
culture”—including the unique folk memories and the special (perhaps 
idiosyncratic) ways of “going on” that have been adopted within that 
particular ethnic, religious, or cultural group.
101
  It would of course be quite 
unreasonable to expect a nation-state in the contemporary, globalized world 
to operate fully in accordance with the thick norms of each and every 
cultural group within its boundaries.  But most thick communities also 
possess, according to Walzer, “a way of talking to people abroad, across 
different cultures, about the thinner life [different groups] have in common” 
and, crucially, he believes that “there are the makings of a thin and 
universalist morality inside every thick and particularist morality.”102  If he 
is right, then within the dialogic process that legitimation requires, part of 
the skill of power-holders in an increasingly globalized world must be to 
help to identify and articulate that shared thin morality, and to negotiate its 
acceptance among a number of communities who espouse different thick 
moralities. 
Secondly, the “shared values” analysis in texts on legitimacy tends to 
assume that a society’s laws arise naturally out of the shared norms of the 
society—an assumption described by Brian Tamanaha as the “mirror 
thesis” (because the law mirrors the values).103  Certainly, the mirror thesis 
is very often correct—for example, the fact that adultery is defined as a 
criminal act in Saudi Arabia obviously reflects the very strong shared 
commitment to Islamic values in that country.
104
  But, as Tamanaha has 
correctly argued, the relationship between laws and values is by no means 
always so straightforward.  In his own study of Micronesia, for example, 
Tamanaha noted that the official law in that country had been transplanted 
in its entirety from the United States, with the consequence that the customs 
and values of the Micronesian people were in many respects radically 
different from those of the official legal system.
105
  Tamanaha’s original 
 
100 MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD, at xi  
(1994). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 1–3 (2001). 
104 Of course other jurisdictions have also criminalized adultery for reasons other than 
Islamic values.  See Joanne Belknap, “Offending Women”: A Double Entendre, 100 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1061, 1068–70 (2010). 
105 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, UNDERSTANDING LAW IN MICRONESIA 2, 55 (1993).  By way of 
example, there existed a “thriving caste system, yet the law prohibited discrimination.”  Or if 
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assumption was that the Micronesian situation was very abnormal, but he 
subsequently concluded that it was “not that unusual after all,” since “legal 
transplantation, either through colonial imposition or through voluntary 
borrowing, is a widespread phenomenon.”106  Clearly, in such contexts, 
“shared values” might be in short supply, and, as in the first example, 
skillful negotiation by power-holders might be required if the legitimacy of 
the official law is to be fostered. 
Thirdly, we have so far assumed that “the law” and “law enforcement” 
are homogeneous concepts and therefore that all those involved in law 
enforcement within a given state are implementing practices based on a 
single set of values.  Empirically speaking, that might be the case, but it is 
by no means necessarily so.  For example, in his essay on police legitimacy 
discussed earlier, David Smith refers to a detailed empirical research study 
that he led in London in the early 1980s.  Smith’s research revealed that 
certain “‘working rules’ of police officers—the guiding principles of their 
conduct—although influenced by the [formal] law, could often diverge 
from it.”107  This divergence was then covered up by the police, who 
developed certain “presentational rules,” which existed “to give an 
acceptable appearance” to the divergence between the formal law and local 
practice.  When we reflect on this example, it seems reasonable to speculate 
that, however well these tactics worked in disguising the true state of affairs 
from, say, the courts or the media, they almost certainly did not deceive 
those local citizens who had dealings with the police (“norm-users,” in 
MacCormick’s helpful phrase108).  If this is correct, then for norm-users in 
such a context, one would need to construct two descriptions of 
legitimacy—one concerning the legitimacy of the official legal system (the 
“law in the books”) and one concerning the legitimacy of the “law in 
practice” (namely, the local police’s actual behavior and their attempts to 
give such behavior a presentationally acceptable appearance). 
4. Shared Beliefs and Values: Specific Values 
As well as considering the general importance of shared values within 
the analysis of audience legitimacy, we think it is important to comment on 
some specific values.  Given limitations of space, we shall focus on only 
 
a criminal offense was committed, in Micronesian custom this “required a response by the 
community itself,” yet the state insisted that any community reaction constituted “illegal 
vigilantism.”  TAMANAHA, supra note 103, at xi. 
106 TAMANAHA, supra note 103, at xii. 
107 Smith, supra note 13, at 43 (referring to the study of London in DAVID J. SMITH & 
JEREMY GRAY, POLICE AND PEOPLE IN LONDON (1985)). 
108 NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW 2 (2007). 
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two such values: procedural justice and effectiveness. 
As previously noted, Beetham claimed that his conceptual framework 
(see Figure 2) is common to all societies.
109
  Yet the framework does not 
mention procedural justice, the dominant tradition within studies of 
legitimacy in criminal justice.  Does that mean that Beetham’s thesis is 
falsified?  Beetham, we think, would rightly deny this; viewed from his 
perspective, the empirical importance of procedural justice arises because of 
the existence, in all social contexts so far examined, of strong shared values 
about the importance of justice, especially procedural justice, in the actions 
of law enforcement officials. 
As previously noted, the broad concept of procedural justice turns out, 
on closer analysis, to encompass two rather different values,
110
 which tend 
to have rather different emotional connotations.  “Quality of 
decisionmaking” embraces a range of concerns that lawyers would place 
together under a general heading such as “the principles of natural 
justice.”111  This will include matters such as people being allowed to have 
their say before a decision that affects them is made;
112
 the independence 
and neutrality of the decisionmaker, as well as his or her technical 
competence; consistency of decisionmaking in similar cases; and so on.
113
  
The second value embraced within procedural justice is more personal.  
Described as “quality of treatment,” it focuses on whether the 
decisionmaker treats the subject in a true sense as a human being, with 
needs for dignity, privacy, respect for his or her moments of weakness, and 
so on.
114
  Research has shown that the absence of either quality of 
decisionmaking or quality of treatment can be powerfully delegitimating. 
In the introduction to this Article, we mentioned David Smith’s words 
of caution about the procedural justice literature.
115
  His reservations are 
primarily empirical,
116
 and two are worth highlighting here.  First, Smith 
points out that “the causes or explanations of legitimacy may not be the 
 
109 BEETHAM, supra note 50, at 22. 
110 See Tyler, supra note 5, at 285. 
111 H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW pt. VI (10th ed. 2009). 
112 This is important not only in formal decisionmaking contexts, but also in more 
informal encounters with authority.  Most people have at some time experienced an 
encounter with a local power-holder (such as a teacher or an airport official) where the 
power-holder insists on a particular outcome and refuses to listen to an explanation as to why 
that outcome seems wrong to the citizen.  The result is, invariably, frustration. 
113 Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural 
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1997). 
114 Tyler, supra note 5, at 329. 
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same at the individual and collective levels; consequently the explanations 
for secular change in police legitimacy in a society from one epoch to 
another may be different from the explanations for intra-individual change 
in legitimacy beliefs.”117  Secondly, after a detailed argument Smith 
suggests that the existing research leaves open the possibility that “prior 
beliefs in police legitimacy (or illegitimacy) are the powerful factor, 
whereas particular experiences of the police are shaped by those beliefs, or 
interpreted and perceived to fit with them.”118  These are clearly important 
points that need to be addressed as the research agenda on legitimacy in 
criminal justice moves forward. 
Smith’s overall conclusion is that, at this stage in the development of 
research on legitimacy, care is needed not to infer “that procedural fairness 
is the sole or central foundation of legitimacy in all societies at all stages of 
development.”119  Clearly, a similar conclusion is reached if one views 
audience legitimacy from the Beetham–Coicaud perspective (which is not 
discussed by Smith). 
The second specific value that we wish to consider in this Section is 
 
117 Id. at 32. 
118 Id. at 33.  Although he does not mention this, Smith’s comments resurrect a debate 
from two decades earlier between Gibson and Tyler & Rasinski.  See James L. Gibson, 
Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court 
Decisions: A Question of Causality, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1991); James L. Gibson, 
Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political 
Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, 
Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. 
Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV 621 (1991).  Gibson 
tested data from a national survey in the United States and found that procedural justice did 
not explain citizens’ compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court.  Reanalyzing the 
same dataset, Tyler & Rasinski argued that the relationship is indirect: procedural justice 
shapes legitimacy, which in turn, influences compliance.  Gibson conceded that the Tyler–
Rasinski hypothesis is plausible, but only in situations where people have had prior 
experiences with legal authorities.  (A later panel study of New York residents by Tyler & 
Fagan confirmed this hypothesis: Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in their Communities?, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008)).  Gibson, however, argues that general assessments of 
institutional legitimacy are more likely to reflect childhood socialization experiences, which 
may then influence people’s views on procedural justice.  To our knowledge, the only 
attempt specifically to test the question of causality experimentally is a 1993 study by 
Mondak.  He suggested that Gibson’s hypothesis might be “the viable explanation” for the 
association between procedural justice and legitimacy and found no support for the Tyler–
Rasinski hypothesis, leading him to the perhaps over-hasty conclusion that this should be 
either “reformulated or discarded.”  Jeffrey J. Mondak, Institutional Legitimacy and 
Procedural Justice: Re-examining the Question of Causality, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 599, 
608 (1993). 
119 Smith, supra note 13, at 31–32. 
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effectiveness.  It is sometimes suggested that effectiveness is a purely 
utilitarian concept and therefore has little to do with the normative notion of 
legitimacy.  However, as Beetham has argued, political legitimacy “requires 
both a morally authoritative source for government, and an ability to satisfy 
the ends which justify its enormous concentration of power.”120  Some 
political scientists have nevertheless seen legitimacy as merely a function of 
effectiveness, an approach that has been described as “eudaemonic 
legitimation” (EL).121  According to the EL thesis, it is effectiveness in 
providing material benefits or prestige to citizens that generates legitimacy; 
hence, citizens will give attributions of legitimacy if and only if it is in their 
self-interest to do so.
122
  In the context of policing, a police force attempting 
to operate with this mode of legitimacy would therefore simply seek to 
demonstrate and appeal to its effectiveness.
123
  A better view, which unlike 
EL maintains legitimacy as a normative concept (and a potential mode of 
normative compliance among citizens), is that effectiveness and legitimacy 
are interdependent and organically interactive.  On this view, effectiveness 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of legitimacy.
124
 
5. Audience Legitimacy: Concluding Comments 
The Beetham–Coicaud conceptual framework is clearly a powerful 
analytic tool in the study of audience legitimacy, and in our view it covers 
most of the ground in answering Tyler et al.’s important question about 
what factors create and sustain audience legitimacy.
125
  But is the 
framework exhaustive—or, otherwise stated, does it cover all possible 
components of audience legitimacy?  Work in political philosophy by Raz 
suggests that the answer to this question is in the negative, but space 
precludes full discussion of this issue.
126
 
One important point in Raz’s discussion does, however, need to be 
highlighted, and this concerns so-called coordination issues.  Particularly in 
modern societies, one important function of laws is to promote the effective 
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coordination of thousands of citizens, each pursuing his or her own 
reasonable purposes, the most obvious example being rules of the road.  At 
the most basic level, in any given territory there needs to be a rule stating 
whether motorists are to drive on the right or the left; but which side is 
chosen is simply a matter of convenience and is therefore hardly a shared 
value in Coicaud’s sense of having “a type of validity that is 
foundational.”127  Yet what we may call the “coordination requirements” in 
any given society do usually carry a high degree of audience legitimacy.  To 
mis-paraphrase Hamlet, there is therefore more to audience legitimacy than 
is dreamt of in the philosophy of Beetham and Coicaud, even though these 
scholars have greatly advanced our understanding of this topic. 
As a final point in the discussion of audience legitimacy, we think it is 
important to return to the distinction between legitimate authority and de 
facto authority.  Combining the insights of Weber and Raz, we can discern 
that the category of de facto authority actually contains two subtypes.  First, 
there are situations where a power-holder is in secure and effective 
command of a territory and claims authority over it, but this claim is 
completely rejected by the audience.  (Many examples of this type of 
situation can be found in the history of colonial rule.) 
There is also a second kind of de facto authority where the ruler’s 
claims to legitimacy are accepted by the public as technically “valid” in 
Weber’s terms, yet this acceptance is not, in the words of Coicaud’s 
definition, a true “recognition of the right to govern.”128  Instead, as Weber 
recognized, such acceptance might be based on, for example, “weakness 
and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative.”129  This second 
type of de facto authority is, empirically speaking, very important because it 
is frequently found in contexts (such as prisons and, in the community, in 
certain kinds of regimes such as military dictatorships) where there is a 
radical power differential between rulers and the ruled.  In such situations, 
the powerless typically have mixed emotions: they feel that someone has to 
hold power; that the current authorities do hold effective de facto power and 
are therefore useful in ensuring a basic flow of essential services; that in 
consequence the power-holders are, in Weber’s terms, a minimally valid 
authority; that powerless people have no way of challenging this de facto 
power anyway; and yet that it is impossible to accord to the power-holders 
any genuine normative authority or true respect.  One striking phrase that 
has been used to express this second kind of de facto authority is “dull 
 
127 COICAUD, supra note 18, at 16; see supra Part IV.A.3. 
128 COICAUD, supra note 18, at 10. 
129 WEBER, supra note 23, at 214. 
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compulsion.”130  In the prison literature, it is well recognized that dull 
compulsion frequently exists, and some hold that prisoners’ acquiescence to 
prison authorities is almost always of this type.
131
  On the evidence, 
however, a better view is that a recognition of true audience legitimacy is 
sometimes accorded by prisoners to certain prison regimes and to individual 
prison officers who carry out their duties in certain ways.
132
 
The distinction between true legitimacy and dull compulsion is, 
conceptually, of great importance in criminal justice contexts, and it can 
also have significant practical consequences.  To give just one example 
from the policing context, if true legitimacy is present, citizens will almost 
certainly be much more willing to provide the police with a good flow of 
information about specific incidents and general matters relevant to social 
order.  Methodologically speaking, the difference between the two 
situations is sometimes hard to establish empirically, but this is a challenge 
that criminological researchers must take seriously.  We return to this issue 
in our final Section. 
B. POWER-HOLDER LEGITIMACY 
Six years ago, Steve Herbert published a paper on police legitimacy; 
the paper is unorthodox (in the sense that it sits somewhat outside the main 
literature on legitimacy in criminal justice) but nevertheless important.
133
  A 
main thesis of the paper is that, given the complexity of and tensions 
between the functions of the police in a liberal-democratic society, “no 
simple solutions exist for enhancing police legitimacy.”134  Instead, Herbert 
understands legitimacy as embracing elements of three different 
requirements for the police service.  The first is a necessary subservience to 
public needs within an elective democracy.  Second, Herbert argues that a 
legitimate police service requires a degree of separation from the public, for 
two reasons: to uphold, when occasion demands, the liberal values of the 
liberal-democratic state (even when these are not currently favored by the 
democratic majority in a particular society);
135
 and to maintain police esprit 
de corps, thereby enhancing effective performance.  Finally, there is a 
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suggested requirement of generativity; Herbert argues that, to be fully 
legitimate, the police sometimes need to go beyond a reactive stance and 
become proactive, taking the initiative in generating (or constructively 
promoting) appropriate kinds of local social order.
136
 
In discussions with senior police officers about legitimacy, we have 
found that they warm to Herbert’s threefold typology.  A major reason for 
this, we believe, is that for Herbert the touchstone of legitimate law 
enforcement is not simply—as the Beetham–Coicaud analysis might 
suggest—a matter of the public reception of police activities (that is, in 
Herbert’s language, subservience).  Rather, in appropriate circumstances 
there are actions that the police can and should take that will enhance their 
legitimacy.
137
  Herbert does not describe these actions in the language of 
“power-holder legitimacy” (as is used in political science), but in fact his 
dimensions of separation and generativity do fit naturally within that 
conceptual framework, and he is almost alone among criminological writers 
in referring to these matters. 
What, then, is power-holder legitimacy?  Recall that in Coicaud’s 
definition, legitimacy is described as “justifying simultaneously political 
power and obedience.”138  It would seem that Coicaud himself might have 
meant by this phrase something like “justifying, in the eyes of those without 
power, both the authority of the power-holder and the obedience of the 
citizen.”  But the actual definition given is also open to a more radical 
interpretation.  On this alternative view, “justifying political power” refers 
to the self-belief that rulers have in their moral right to govern—a self-
belief that then underpins the claims to legitimacy that, in the Weber–Raz 
analysis, power-holders virtually always make and then attempt to 
sustain.
139
  As Barker pointed out, such self-belief is frequently also made 
manifest in the actions of power-holders (such as “speech, writing, ritual, 
[or] display”), whereby they “justify to themselves or others the actions 
they are taking and the identities they are expressing or claiming.”140  In the 
field of criminal justice, the wearing of uniforms clearly fulfills an 
expressive self-legitimating function of this kind, as well as the more 
utilitarian function of easy identification by colleagues and citizens. 
Discussions of the power-holder dimension of legitimacy stretch back 
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to the work of Max Weber.  As Kronman observes, Weber considered that 
people with power or privilege do not only seek to legitimate their status to 
those lacking it; they must also “persuade themselves that their fates are 
deserved and therefore rightful.”141  Weber himself elaborated this point: 
The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate.  Beyond this, he 
needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune.  He wants to be convinced that 
he ‘deserves’ it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others.  He 
wishes to be allowed the belief that the less fortunate also merely experiences his due.  
Good fortune thus wants to be ‘legitimate’ fortune.
142
 
Furthermore, Weber saw power-holder legitimacy as a necessary 
precondition for successful audience legitimation.  As Kronman puts it, in 
Weber’s eyes “to the extent that he anticipates and understands the criticism 
of those who are less fortunate, the man of good fortune must already be a 
critic himself.”143  Following Weber’s lead, a number of political scientists 
have subsequently emphasized the fundamental importance of this 
dimension of legitimacy and have warned that legitimacy is in danger of 
becoming a meaningless and irrelevant concept if the power-holder 
dimension is ignored or underplayed.
144
 
Although Weber considered the power-holder dimension to be 
foundational, he did not develop his analysis of it as fully as he did with the 
audience dimension.  There must therefore be some doubt about the 
grounds upon which, according to Weber, power-holders would seek to 
justify the rightness of their power to themselves.  However, given the 
privileged position Weber assigns to formal legality within “legitimate 
domination” in modern societies,145 it is not unreasonable to speculate that 
legality would play an important part in his analysis.  That is to say that 
power-holders will believe in their own legitimacy if and only if they 
ensure that the positions they occupy, the powers they wield, and the 
manner in which such powers are exercised on a day-to-day basis are 
formally and legally correct.  We would argue, however, that this is only a 
necessary condition, and not a sufficient one; as with audience legitimacy, 
power-holders must also cultivate their self-legitimacy with reference to the 
beliefs shared by them and their audience.  As Wrong put it, given that 
power-holders have “a need to believe that the power they possess is 
morally justified,” they tend also to believe that “they are servants of a 
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larger collective goal or system of values surpassing mere determination to 
perpetuate themselves in power, [and] that their exercise of power is not 
inescapably at odds with hallowed standards of morality.”146 
Of course, in a democracy, power-holders’ self-belief in their 
legitimacy cannot be the ultimate test of whether they are acting 
legitimately.
147
  Nevertheless, power-holder legitimacy remains important 
for several reasons.  First, power-holders cannot and should not be expected 
to carry out their daily work with reference only to current public opinion; 
and in any case, some aspects of that work—certainly in the case of the 
police and prison staff—are necessarily secret, so they cannot be subject to 
immediate public scrutiny.  In other words, as Herbert argued, a degree of 
self-separation by power-holders is often both appropriate and necessary in 
exercising authority responsibly.
148
  Second, power-holder legitimacy may 
be important for the stability and effectiveness of authority.  Unless those 
who exercise power are convinced that there is an adequate moral 
justification for their continuation in office, they are unlikely to be 
effective.  As Boulding put it, often a loss of what he called “internal 
legitimacy” can lead to “disorganization of behavior and an inability to 
perform an assigned role.”149  Third, as previously suggested, power-holder 
legitimacy can be regarded as a precondition for successful audience 
legitimacy; that is, it is necessary for power-holders to cultivate belief in the 
moral rightness of their own legitimacy before making claims to others to 
be their legitimate rulers.
150
  Fourth, within what we have described as the 
dialogic framework necessarily flowing from Weber’s claim–response 
conceptual scheme, a vital element of analyses of legitimacy within real-life 
criminal justice contexts must be the careful examination of the responses 
by power-holders to audiences’ perceptions of legitimacy deficits.151  
Within the dialogic framework, legitimacy is constantly in flux; it is a 
significant test for power-holders when it becomes clear that a relevant 
audience has rejected one or more aspects of their initial claim to 
legitimacy.  In such circumstances, the power-holder must put forward a 
revised claim to legitimacy, which in turn might well require adjustments in 
their own understanding of their right to rule. 
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Because analyses of power-holder legitimacy have been conducted 
almost exclusively by political scientists, the existing literature in this field 
has tended to focus predominantly on the ruling elite, thereby potentially 
missing the significant role in social order played by more junior power-
holders (such as front-line police and prison officers) who are in direct 
contact with citizens and often exercise a significant degree of local power 
on a daily basis.
152
  Nonetheless, “as dominated dominators or, more 
precisely, as dominated parties within the field of power,” such junior 
power-holders can be regarded as a special group.
153
  Thus, for example, 
police officers on patrol are “the state made flesh . . . .  [T]hey are the most 
direct representatives of the state for citizens given their visible, uniformed, 
24-hour presence on the streets and their crucial involvement in social 
intervention and law enforcement.”154  Yet simultaneously they are also the 
least powerful group within what is often a large criminal justice 
bureaucracy.  Therefore, the decisions of police managers undoubtedly set 
limits for ordinary officers; but equally, the outcome of a single disastrous 
high-profile police–public interaction on the street, or a mistake by a prison 
officer leading to an escape, might have major repercussions for their whole 
organization.  This complex dual role underscores the importance of 
ordinary officers’ cultivation of appropriate (and not excessive) self-
confidence in their moral right to exercise the enormous powers vested in 
them. 
Rodney Barker suggests that power-holder legitimation (or what he 
calls “endogenous legitimation”) can be conceptualized as occurring in a 
series of concentric circles, with rulers at the center, followed by their staff, 
then “mighty citizens,” and finally ordinary citizens at the periphery.155  He 
further contends that “at each stage out from the centre [endogenous 
legitimation] is likely to be carried out with less time, attention, energy, and 
intensity.”156  Although empirically speaking this is an untested issue, we 
suspect that in the sphere of criminal justice this hypothesis might not 
survive the detailed and “severe” testing that Popper recommends.157  That 
 
152 See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1980). 
153 John Frow, Economies of Value, in RECEPTION STUDY 294, 313 (James L. Machor & 
Philip Goldstein eds., 2001) (quoting Pierre Bourdieu, The Corporatism of the Universal: 
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1989)). 
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is because, in this context, it is disproportionately the front-line police 
officers and prison officers, rather than their managers, who have direct and 
recurrent encounters with citizens and prisoners, and therefore experience 
their authority being contested on a day-to-day basis.  Consequently, it 
seems likely that front-line officers might invest a good deal of energy, 
time, and attention in cultivating and confirming to themselves the moral 
validity of their positions and authority. 
A difficult conceptual problem for power-holder legitimacy concerns 
the “disconnected” power-holder who has lost touch with the public he 
serves.  Such power-holders might reasonably be described as narcissistic, a 
condition that can involve self-absorption and an inflated self-image, or an 
attitude of indifference to the plight of others.
158
  Unfortunately, under 
certain circumstances, members of both police and prison services can very 
easily slide into this kind of attitude.  In the policing context, this can be 
seen in the practice of so-called noble cause corruption, where officers 
subscribe to the view that it is appropriate to manufacture evidence against 
a suspect because “he is clearly guilty anyway.”159  Similarly, in the 
aftermath of prison riots and disturbances, it is well known that officers 
may take it upon themselves to inflict what they regard as “justified 
punishment” to the surrendering prisoners, although they know that the 
state formally forbids such actions on their part.  When officers act in such 
a fashion, they are implicitly making claims to possession of a higher 
normative validity than that which the state represents; adherence to the 
norms they espouse is, in their view, a necessity for a decent society to 
survive.  By contrast to such ideologies, a healthier view of power-holder 
legitimacy asserts that “means and ends are not separate; the things we care 
about profoundly affect how we honour [them].”160  In a criminal justice 
context, the development of power-holder legitimacy is therefore best 
understood as the cultivation of self-confidence in the moral rightness of 
power-holders’ authority, within a framework of both official laws and 
regulations, and societal normative expectations. 
V. WHY IS LEGITIMACY IMPORTANT WITHIN A SOCIAL SYSTEM? 
We turn now to the last of the three searching questions posed by Tyler 
 
158 See ERICH FROMM, THE HEART OF MAN 73 (1964); Leonidas K. Cheliotis, Narcissism, 
Humanism and the Revolutionary Character in Erich Fromm’s Work, in ROOTS, RITES AND 
SITES OF RESISTANCE 36, 40–41 (Leonidas K. Cheliotis ed., 2010) (discussing narcissism 
within criminal justice contexts). 
159 See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, The Necessity of Dishonesty: Police Deviance, “Making 
the Case,” and the Public Good, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 113 (2008). 
160 MARGARET S. ARCHER, BEING HUMAN: THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY 84 (2000). 
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et al. in their introductory chapter in the Russell Sage Foundation volume: 
Why is legitimacy important within a social system—or, we may add, a 
criminal justice system?
161
  For most criminologists who have considered 
the concept of legitimacy, including Tyler and his colleagues, the answer to 
this question has focused on improvements in legal compliance by citizens, 
a better flow of intelligence on local social order (for example, in a 
neighborhood or within a prison), and a greater willingness on the part of 
the public to empower criminal justice agencies.  Such claims are not in 
dispute here, not least because there is substantial empirical evidence in 
support of them.  For example, Paternoster and his colleagues found that 
arrestees for spousal assault who thought the police had treated them fairly 
(i.e., legitimately) were less likely to reoffend.
162
  Or again, in New York, 
Sunshine and Tyler reported that perceptions of police legitimacy explained 
people’s compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities.163  
And using data from a nationwide telephone survey in the United States, 




Notwithstanding the considerable importance of this body of literature, 
it can be criticized as offering an insufficient answer to the question of why 
legitimacy matters within a social system and a criminal justice system.  
There are two reasons for this view.  First, there is at least tentative 
evidence in the context of imprisonment that non-legitimate practices 
(especially those failing to respect a prisoner’s human needs and dignity, 
i.e., a failure in Tyler’s “quality of treatment” from Figure 1) can lead to 
significant personal distress and an enhanced risk of attempted suicide.
165
  
Secondly and more broadly, one can reasonably argue, in light of Coicaud’s 
definition of legitimacy, that issues such as the improvement of legal 
compliance, boosting the flow of intelligence to criminal justice agencies, 
and so on—while certainly important—do not go to the heart of 
legitimacy’s central focus, namely the recognition of the right to govern.166  
In this Section, we shall accordingly focus on two matters that are more 
central to that core issue. 
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A. LEGITIMACY AS MORAL RECOGNITION 
Richard Sparks and his colleagues, at the end of their book on order 
and legitimacy in maximum security prisons, report a challenging 
discussion with a prison governor, who asked a pointed question: “Does all 
this mean that legitimacy is just about pleasing the prisoners?”167  A core 
element of the authors’ response concerns the degree to which prisoners’ 
demands or complaints had any “basis of moral support in [the wider] 
society.”168  The distinction between “good” and “right” relationships in 
prison, noted earlier, rests on the same basis.  Right relationships are those 
that do indeed respect the prisoner as a human being, take account of his 
welfare needs, and so on, yet at the same time uphold and maintain the 
societal norms under which it was deemed necessary to require the 
individual to serve a prison sentence.  Right relationships between prison 
staff and prisoners are therefore those that can be morally supported within 
the norms of society at large, and not simply those demanded by those with 
a particular stake in the matter (in this instance, prisoners). 
But what happens if the moral standards of a given society allow a 
type of behavior that seems to outside observers to be questionable, or even 
evil?  Here, we return to the strong fact–value distinction that is so 
important within Weber’s thought and to Hinsch’s distinction between 
empirical and normative concepts of legitimacy.
169
  If legitimacy depends 
simply on the moral standards of a given society, and if societies can 
“invent” for themselves any kind of moral basis for the authority of a 
particular regime,
170
 then, as David Smith points out, it follows that “the 
authorities are legitimate if people generally believe that they ought to be 
obeyed”171 and “a political system . . . though clearly evil, can still be 
legitimate.”172  To give a concrete but hypothetical example: if in a given 
state there is an ethnic minority population constituting 1% of the 
population, and the parliament of that state passes (with massive and 
enthusiastic support from the majority population) a statute saying that the 
minority is to be eliminated in death camps, then it would seem that, 
according to the law and the shared values of that society, this enactment 
 
167 SPARKS ET AL., supra note 7, at 329. 
168 Id. at 330.  For example, Sparks et al. argue that requests for civilized conditions for 
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must—on this kind of analysis—be regarded as entirely legitimate. 
This uncomfortable conclusion can only be challenged by contesting 
aspects of the strong fact–value distinction upon which it rests.  This is not 
the place, nor are we the appropriate authors, to discuss this issue in any 
detail.  But it is relevant to note one main argument that has been deployed 
in moral philosophy against the so-called Naturalistic Fallacy (that is, the 
alleged fallacy of deriving evaluative statements from factual statements).
173
  
This argument has been well summarized by Alasdair MacIntyre, and it 
concerns “functional concepts,” that is, nouns that in themselves embody an 
understanding of the purposes or functions expected to be fulfilled by a 
person or thing.
174
  To use MacIntyre’s own examples, a watch has the 
purpose or function of telling the time accurately, and an arable farm has 
the purpose or function of growing crops such as wheat or hay.  It follows, 
says MacIntyre, “that the concept of a watch cannot be defined 
independently of the concept of a good watch”—obviously, a watch is not a 
good watch if it does not accurately keep time.
175
  In consequence of this, a 
factual statement (such as: “He gets a better yield per acre for his wheat 
than most other farmers, and in his farming practices he takes great care to 
minimize any damage to the natural environment”) can validly lead to the 
evaluative conclusion that “he is a good farmer.”  Thus, for functional 
concepts, the so-called Naturalistic Fallacy does not apply, and the fact–
value distinction is breached. 
It is not hard to see how this line of argument might be applied to 
criminal justice contexts.  Suppose it is factually true both that “XY is a 
chief of police” and that “XY regularly accepts secret payments from the 
mafia.”  In such circumstances, it would validly follow that “XY is not a 
good chief of police.”  Given all this, as MacIntyre points out, it is rather 
astonishing that most philosophers of the early- and mid-twentieth century 
apparently “took it for granted that no moral arguments involve functional 
concepts.”176  This is particularly ironic given that “moral arguments within 
the classical, Aristotelian tradition—whether in its Greek or its medieval 
versions—involve at least one central functional concept,” namely the 
concept of humankind.
177
  That is to say, humans have been understood, 
within the Aristotelian and Thomist traditions, “as having an essential 
 
173 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
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nature and an essential purpose or function.”178  And, we may add, those 
same Aristotelian philosophers considered that governments and legal 
authorities also have an essential purpose or function, which includes the 
dispensing of justice within the community for which they have 
responsibility. 
Consequent upon the work of MacIntyre and others, so-called virtue 
ethics of an Aristotelian kind, and more recently of other kinds, have in the 
last thirty years enjoyed a remarkable renaissance.
179
  More generally, 
within moral philosophy, subjectivist and relativist positions are now much 
more frequently criticized (though they are still supported by some 
scholars).
180
  These are very significant developments that have transformed 
moral philosophy almost beyond recognition in the last half-century.
181
 
It is appropriate to note two important consequences of these 
developments for the social scientific study of legitimacy.  First, when 
faced with examples such as that of the society wishing to eliminate an 
ethnic minority, one can no longer so confidently say that there is no 
objective basis for moral judgments and that any society can therefore 
invent any kind of political system it wishes, and still call it moral and 
legitimate.  This consequence is crucially important in the present context, 
because it begins to provide an epistemological basis for what Hinsch called 
“‘objective’ criteria of legitimacy.”182  Secondly, if indeed descriptive and 
evaluative statements concerning human beings and governments are more 
intertwined than social scientists following Weber have traditionally 
believed, then this has a crucial consequence: the study of the normative 
can no longer be (as so often in the past) either eliminated from the sphere 
of social science altogether or restricted to descriptive statements about 
people’s moral beliefs and their consequences.  Taken together, these two 
points are of the greatest significance.
183
  Among other things, they have the 
consequence that the literature on legitimacy needs to be connected more 
firmly to the literature on justice, just as in political science generally, 
theories of democracy and theories of justice need to be brought more fully 
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Related to this discussion is a recent paper on the development of 
cross-national European indicators of “trust in justice,” in which Jackson et 
al. attempted to operationalize Hinsch’s dual empirical–normative concepts 
of legitimacy.
185
  This is indeed a novel and interesting development, 
especially as Hinsch himself has argued that it is possible to “affirm both 
[concepts] simultaneously.”186  Jackson et al. measure “empirical 
legitimacy” using survey responses from individual citizens and normative 
legitimacy by what they describe as “objective behaviours of criminal 
justice institutions.”187  As examples of the latter, the authors refer to the 
“normative justifiability of power (for example, defined as levels of 
democratic accountability and transparency)” and to the “legality of action 
[of criminal justice institutions] (for example, defined as levels of 
cooperation and abuse).”188  These are interesting suggestions, but the 
approach would seem to require some significant elaboration to be fully 
convincing, given both the general complexity of establishing objective 
normative standards and, more particularly, Hinsch’s comment that “any 
particular normative conception of legitimacy . . . has to expound its 
substantive criteria of legitimacy in a way that explains why meeting these 
criteria actually confers normative authority on . . . institutions or 
persons”189—a task that Jackson et al. do not attempt. 
B. LEGITIMACY AS DIALOGUE 
We turn now to a second reason for seeking to transcend issues of 
compliance in explaining why legitimacy is important within a social 
system; here we focus especially on the dialogic character of legitimacy.  
To begin with a cross-sectional analysis, if the two dimensions of power-
holder and audience legitimacy are brought together, it is possible to treat 
them as the X and Y coordinates in a simple matrix, with the possibility not 
only of congruence (for example, both the power-holder and the audience 
regard the power-holder as securely legitimate) but also of incongruence 
(for example, the power-holder has a secure view of his legitimacy that is 
not shared by the audience).
190
  Such examples immediately raise questions 
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of stability and change over time in criminal justice organizations.  For 
example, strain may be generated if, in a given context, there is a significant 
variation between power-holders and a given group of citizens about what 
should count as reasonable grounds for (1) the power-holder to make 
legitimacy claims and (2) the audience to accept the power-holder as a 
legitimate authority.  The result, as the dialogue develops, can be a 
momentous change in how a criminal justice agency operates and even how 
it is constituted.  An example of this is the aftermath of the 1981 Brixton 
riots in London, previously discussed.
191
  The legitimacy deficit exposed by 
the riots and Lord Scarman’s subsequent official inquiry led, among other 
things, to significant changes in police recruitment procedures, with much 
more active attempts to recruit members of ethnic minorities in order to 
make the police service more representative of the community that it 
served.  Thus, legitimacy (or, in this instance, lack of legitimacy) was seen 
to be very important to a social system, but its importance went well 
beyond issues of legal compliance.  Rather, the eventual key issue was a 
debate, within a multi-ethnic society, about the appropriate makeup of the 
police service if the service’s claims to be exercising good governance were 
to remain credible. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
As we noted at the outset, the aim of this Article is primarily 
theoretical.  It is, therefore, not our intention to provide detailed guidelines 
for the measurement and study of the conceptual issues we have raised 
above.  Nevertheless, we consider it to be important, in concluding, to offer 
some general comments relating to future empirical research on legitimacy 
in criminological contexts, because we fully recognize that we shall only 
have achieved our purpose if some of the theoretical propositions that we 
have advanced are, in the future, developed and tested through empirical 
research. 
For reasons of space, we restrict the discussion in this Section to three 
principal topics: studying power-holder legitimacy, measuring audience 
legitimacy, and developing longitudinal research on legitimacy. 
A. STUDYING POWER-HOLDER LEGITIMACY 
First, we suggest that our analysis highlights an urgent need to develop 
studies of power-holder legitimacy, given that empirical studies of 
legitimacy in the field of criminal justice have, up to now, been focused 
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almost exclusively on audience legitimacy. 
In the field of political science, studies of power-holder legitimacy 
have focused predominantly on high-level political actors.  One conclusion 
to emerge from such studies concerns the importance of the relationship 
between an executive leader and his or her immediate followers; indeed, in 
some political systems acceptance of the legitimacy of such a leader by his 
or her inner circle has been shown to be crucial to the survival of the 
regime.
192
  One can analyze some very complex processes here, as Rodney 
Barker suggests: 
Rulers are legitimating themselves in their own eyes; at the same time they are 
legitimating themselves in the sight of their immediate supporters . . . ; the governing 
community [leader plus immediate supporters] is legitimating itself collectively in its 
own eyes; and the governing community is legitimating itself in the eyes of ordinary 
subjects.193 
A similar analysis could usefully be undertaken within large criminal 
justice organizations—for example, a state-level prison service or the 
principal police service in a conurbation.
194
  However, criminological 
researchers cannot realistically restrict the study of power-holder legitimacy 
to the dimensions articulated by Barker (which, it will be noted, jump 
straight from the “governing community” to citizens).  This is because, as 
previously noted, within criminal justice systems most front-line staff are 
themselves significant power-holders.  Hence, the full study of power-
holder legitimacy in the field of criminal justice necessarily requires 
attention to be paid, not only to senior but also to junior power-holders and 
to the interaction between them. 
That in turn suggests, secondly, that the study of power-holder 
legitimacy would, in criminal justice contexts, benefit from adopting a 
holistic perspective on criminal justice organizations.  Interestingly, Tyler 
and Blader extended the procedural justice research tradition to the study of 
work organizations with an empirical study of 400 employees making a 
variety of judgments about cooperation within their respective work 
organizations.
195
  In their final empirical model, incentives and rewards had 
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no direct influence on any of the indices of cooperation.
196
  Much more 
powerful were “status judgments,” such as pride in group membership and 
self-identification with the organization (exemplified by questions such as: 
“When I talk about where I work, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’”).  In 
turn, these status judgments were strongly influenced by perceptions of 
procedural justice, as experienced by employees within the organization.
197
 
It is important, however, to note that Tyler and Blader’s study, and 
other related studies such as that by Tyler, Callahan, and Frost,
198
 focus on 
judgments that employees make about the procedural justice and legitimacy 
of their organizations.  These studies, therefore, do not cover what might be 
regarded as a key issue in power-holder legitimacy, namely the degree of 
self-belief that those employees (e.g., law enforcement officers) have in the 
moral rightness of their own claims to exercise power.  Therefore, it would 
be interesting and important to test whether, by extension, the experiences 
of procedural justice within their organizations might also affect the level of 
confidence that front-line police and prison staff express in their own 
legitimacy when dealing with citizens or prisoners.  Pursuing these 
speculations a little further, Jack Barbalet has argued that “feelings of 
confidence arise from acceptance and recognition in social relationships.”199  
Might it be the case, therefore, that peer relationships (with officers of the 
same rank) are also relevant to officers’ confidence in their own 
legitimacy?
200
  These are all researchable but largely unresearched 
questions. 
Thirdly, focusing on the self-beliefs in legitimacy of front-line 
criminal justice staff, there is clearly a need to study how such officers 
reach their self-beliefs, and the content of such beliefs in terms of legality, 
shared values, and so on.  For example, what importance do officers assign 
to the manner in which they exercise their authority, the ends that particular 
practices are designed to achieve and their relationship to community 
values, and so on?  Within prison studies, Liebling and colleagues have 
reported on their use of innovative research techniques, such as asking 
prison officers “what makes a good prison officer?” and then—following a 
Danish precedent—inviting them to name an individual whom they 
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considered to be a role model for other officers to follow.
201
  Clearly, such 
techniques could be adapted so as to focus more specifically on issues of 
power-holder legitimacy.  We also need to know more about the 
consequences of officers’ self-beliefs.  For example, Margaret Archer has 
argued that people with different identities “will evaluate the same 
situations quite differently and their responses will vary accordingly.”202  If 
that is correct, we should expect individual differences in officers’ beliefs 
about self-legitimacy, as well as the social and institutional context, to 
influence how they perceive, evaluate, and respond to situations.  Thus, 
properly developed, the exercise of power-holder legitimacy should result 
in a critical self-awareness by police and prison officers of the importance 
of the ways in which they view themselves and use power.  This should in 
turn help to explain the quality of interactions that officers with differential 




Finally, studies are needed on the consequences of “legitimacy 
deficits” (see Figure 2) and how criminal justice agencies react to such 
deficits in terms of their own beliefs and practices.  As previously noted, 
there can often be a significant gap between what criminal justice agencies 
believe is the legitimacy of their own authority and the assessments of 
various audiences.  Where such a gap exists and is brought to the attention 
of the agency, research could usefully address the nature of the actions that 
are taken in response and the success or otherwise of these actions. 
B. MEASURING AUDIENCE LEGITIMACY 
“Measurement, it would seem, first requires some degree of clarity 
about what is to be measured.”204  When we scrutinize the existing survey 
research on legitimacy in light of this aphorism, we find that despite the 
major contributions of this research, there remains some room for 
improvement.  In these studies, audience legitimacy is often measured—as 
in Tyler’s original work—using two principal subscales, namely: perceived 
obligation to obey the law and expressed allegiance or support for legal 
 
201 LIEBLING ET AL, supra note 89, at 48–57. 
202 MARGARET S. ARCHER, STRUCTURE, AGENCY AND THE INTERNAL CONVERSATION 139 
(2003). 
203 This approach could perhaps be fruitfully related to the Alpert and Dunham’s 
“authority maintenance theory,” although that discussion is beyond the scope of the present 
Article.  See GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF 
FORCE ch. 8 (2004). 
204 ALVIN GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 17 (1964). 




  Subsequent studies have used, in various combinations, four 
different subscales, which may on occasion be combined into an overall 
audience legitimacy scale; these include the two subscales already 
mentioned, plus cynicism about the law and institutional trust.
206
  More 
recently Tyler et al. have measured legitimacy using questions aimed to 
establish to what extent subjects “felt an obligation to obey the law and felt 
trust and confidence in legal authorities.”207 
When we scrutinize the construct validity of these measurements in 
light of the analysis in this Article, a number of questions arise.  The two 
most important of these concern issues of “trust” and of “perceived 
obligation to obey the law.” 
Jack Barbalet, writing about trust, has said that “a confusion of trust 
with legitimacy . . . can only obstruct a satisfactory account of trust.  
Explanatory theory is not advanced by making one key concept do the work 
of many.”208  Trust tends to be future-oriented and may be defined as “a 
positive feeling of expectation regarding another’s future actions.”209  This 
definition is consistent with Tyler and Huo’s concept of motive-based trust, 
which concerns “inferences about the intentions behind actions, intentions 
that flow from a person’s unobservable motivations and character.”210  It is, 
they note further, “an estimate of the character and motives of others” and 
serves as the basis for predicting “whether [they] will act reasonably toward 
us in the future.”211  Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a concept focused on 
the present; it is concerned with recognition of the moral rightness of claims 
to exercise power here and now, rather than in the future.  The question of 
whether and how the two concepts are related is an empirical one that 
requires careful investigation; conceptually, however, they are not identical. 
As an example of the conceptual difference, which also points to the 
importance of specifying the particularities of trust relationships, consider 
the case of residents of nationalist West Belfast during the period of “The 
Troubles” in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and early 1990s.  These citizens 
explicitly rejected the legitimacy of the then-official police service in 
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Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which they 
regarded as having been originally imposed by a quasi-colonial power 
(England) and as endemically institutionally biased against their (Catholic 
and nationalist) community.  They, therefore, certainly did not trust the 
RUC to police their area fairly, and given the level of hostility in the 
community, the RUC in turn only entered the area in armored cars.  
Nevertheless, residents of West Belfast frequently reported crimes such as 
burglary to the RUC for insurance purposes, trusting that the police would 
deal with the matter professionally, as indeed they did.
212
 
The concept of “perceived obligation to obey the law” also cannot be 
straightforwardly equated to legitimacy.  As we have noted in earlier 
sections, there are several reasons other than true legitimacy why people 
might express feelings of obligation to obey the law: these include 
structurally-generated apathy and pragmatic acquiescence (dull compulsion) 
and instrumental calculations.
213
  To measure true legitimacy, these 
alternative motives need to be disentangled; however, most existing studies 
have not paid sufficient attention to the need for this disentanglement. 
Jackson et al. recently asked people, in a European survey: 
To what extent is it your duty to: 
do what the police tell you to do, even if you don’t like how they treat you? 
back the decisions made by the police even when you disagree with them? 
do what the police tell you even if you don't understand or agree with the reasons?
214
 
One of the anonymous reviewers of the present paper suggested that 
these formulations avoid the problems described above.  It is, however, 
hard to agree with this view, given that the term “duty” is not further 
elaborated in the interview schedule.  Thus, respondents could reasonably 
regard “duty” as a legal duty, or a moral duty, or a mixture of the two; it is 
also conceivable that some respondents, not being conversant with the 
dictionary definition of “duty,” might treat it as being neither.  If the duty is 
primarily legal, then it reflects a situation of de facto authority rather than 
true legitimacy.
215
  If respondents treat “duty” as meaning simply “I have to 
do this,” it could be dull compulsion.  Legitimacy researchers will 
accordingly need some deeper explorations to disentangle the varied 
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motives that might underpin people’s feelings of obligation to obey 
criminal justice agencies. 
Experimentation with fresh ways of measuring legitimacy could also 
be valuable.  Our analysis in this Article shows that central to audience 
legitimacy are two ultimately interdependent issues: (1) the legality of the 
activities of law enforcement officials, and (2) whether and to what extent 
the law itself and the manner of its enforcement express the shared values 
of the community within which that law operates.  Empirical studies 
incorporating measures focused on legality and shared values therefore 
seem likely to offer valuable starting points for improved construct validity 
in future studies of audience legitimacy.
216
  As we indicated previously, 
however, such an approach will necessarily incorporate rather than supplant 
Tyler’s procedural justice arguments, since its two dimensions—quality of 
decisionmaking and quality of treatment—are embraced with the notion of 
shared values.  As previously argued in Part IV.A.4, another specific shared 
value that could be incorporated is effectiveness.  Thus, we envisage a 
multi-dimensional measurement of legitimacy embracing (at least) legality, 
procedural justice, and effectiveness. 
C. DEVELOPING LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH STUDIES ON LEGITIMACY 
The dialogic approach to legitimacy that we have outlined in this 
Article requires, above all, the adoption of longitudinal research strategies, 
so that the claim–response dialogue, which is necessarily dynamic, can be 
studied over a reasonable period of time.  The kind of questions that might 
be addressed within such a framework includes the following: Under what 
circumstances and why might the audience legitimacy of a criminal justice 
agency (or a given part of it) increase, decrease, or remain stable?
217
  Does 
the self-belief in legitimacy of front-line officers vary systematically with 
changes in audience legitimacy?  What effects do major incidents in the 
“life course” of the organization (for example, illegalities such as corruption 
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scandals, or major riots in prisons or deprived communities) have on 
power-holder and audience legitimacy?  What sorts of actions by the 
criminal justice organization work (or do not work) by way of re-
legitimation, and in what contexts? 
An interesting prototype for the kind of longitudinal analysis that we 
have in mind may perhaps be found in James Jacobs’s classic study of 
Stateville Prison, Illinois, over a period of half a century (1925–1975).218  
Although Jacobs’ work contains no explicit discussion of legitimacy theory, 
it is not hard to see how the use of such theorization could enrich the 
analysis.  To conclude this Article, therefore, we summarize one decade of 
the Stateville story, in a narrative that vividly illustrates the dialogic 
character of legitimacy. 
For twenty-five years from 1936 to 1961, Stateville’s then-warden, 
Joseph Ragen, exercised a strongly authoritarian and very personal 
dominance over both guards and inmates, and he largely insulated the 
institution from outside influences.  In 1961, Ragen left Stateville and was 
succeeded by his former assistant warden, Frank Pate.  But Pate’s decade in 
power (1961–1970) was uncomfortable, and among the many problems that 
beset him were: 
 The state’s Department of Public Safety increasingly wished to 
influence detailed policies in the prison.  For example, in 1965 a new 
and liberal director of the Department decreed that Stateville inmates 
could, if they wished, take off their uniform caps in the summer 
months.  Ten years later, this decision was still “recalled with 




 In the context of the emerging civil rights movement, prisoners—
especially black prisoners—became increasingly assertive about 
prison conditions and prisoners’ rights. 
 The courts abandoned their previous “hands off” doctrines as 
regards lawsuits relating to prison conditions. 
Thus, the power dynamics of running Stateville were changing, but—
significantly—Pate’s response was anything but flexible.  As an incoming 
senior staff member later put it, management “wouldn’t give the inmate 
anything,” preferring to try to maintain the caste-like distance between staff 
and prisoners that had pertained in the Ragen era.
220
  In consequence, the 
growing demands of an emergent group of Black Muslim prisoners were all 
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routinely denied.  Inevitably, the end result was a court case, where Pate’s 
policy stance came under severe strain.  In a public arena, the 
administration seemed to the court and to the public to be “capricious and 
arbitrary”; they could, for example, “make no rational argument for 
allowing Christian inmates to read the Bible but for refusing to allow 
Muslim inmates the Quran.”221  Moreover, “[t]o the inmate population the 
picture of the [inmate plaintiff] and Pate testifying against one another as 
equal adversaries did much to increase the Muslims’ prestige.”222 
In the terminology utilized in this Article, these events illustrate an 
inflexible and ultimately failed attempt by the prison’s power-holders to 
make credible claims for their own legitimacy within a context of changing 
social values and a changed legal framework.  Inevitably, this stance 
adversely affected audience legitimacy, both with prisoners and with the 
outside community.  Indeed James Jacobs’s judgment was that, ultimately, 
the Pate administration’s inflexibility in the 1960s “made inevitable the 
complete collapse of authority [in Stateville] after 1970.”223 
Thus, read through the appropriate theoretical lenses, Jacobs’s 
Stateville research provides an eloquently persuasive (if embryonic) case 
study of the future potential of longitudinal studies of legitimacy, where 
legitimacy is itself seen as a dialogic process, and where its focus is upon 
the recognition of the right to govern, and not simply upon audience 
compliance. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“The problem of order,” Dennis Wrong has persuasively argued, is “a 
genuinely transhistorical problem rooted in inescapable conflict between the 
interests and desires of individuals and the requirements of society.”224  
Therefore, the task that confronts power-holders (including criminal justice 
agencies) in any society concerns how they can “secure [the] establishment 
of cooperative social relations making possible the pursuit of collective 
goals.”225  That will usually require a degree of coercion, but the task will 
be immensely aided if the power-holders are widely regarded in that society 
as, in the fullest sense, having the right to rule; that is to say, their authority 
is regarded as truly legitimate. 
However, the concept of legitimacy is elusive and multifaceted.  This 
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Article has therefore been written in the hope of developing an improved 
conceptualization of legitimacy within the sphere of criminal justice, 
believing as we do that legitimacy in criminal justice plays a key role in the 
establishment of what Wrong described as “cooperative social relations.” 
Our Article began with a summary of Tom Tyler’s groundbreaking 
series of studies that have contributed so much to the present understanding 
of legitimacy in criminal justice research.  The Tylerian model holds that 
judgments about procedural justice—defined as encompassing quality of 
decisionmaking and quality of interpersonal treatment—shape people’s 
assessments of the legitimacy of legal institutions.  Those assessments, in 
turn, have been shown to explain decision acceptance, support for legal 
institutions, and legal compliance. 
Drawing on the political science and sociology literature, we have 
argued a case for going beyond—but emphatically not jettisoning—the 
procedural justice framework.  We have accordingly proposed a dialogic 
understanding of legitimacy that necessarily draws attention to, and links, 
two interrelated dimensions: those of power-holder legitimacy and audience 
legitimacy.  Contemporary criminal justice research has focused almost 
exclusively on the latter, but we have sought to argue that power-holder 
legitimacy can be of equal importance. 
Several implications follow from our analysis, and two may be 
highlighted here.  First, the dialogic approach to legitimacy necessarily 
alters the answer to the pertinent question “why is legitimacy important 
within a criminal justice system?”  Traditionally, answers to this question 
have focused on legal compliance, but a dialogic approach widens this to 
include issues such as the justification of the claims to legitimacy made by 
power-holders, as well as matters of organizational stability and change.  
This wider focus ultimately requires a linking of legitimacy to questions of 
justice. 
The second implication concerns the measurement of legitimacy 
within future empirical studies.  As we hope we have demonstrated, it is 
vitally important—particularly in criminal justice contexts, where power 
imbalances are often found—to frame survey questions so that they do not 
conflate dull compulsion and true legitimacy.  Also, if our analysis is 
correct, one must in future studies distinguish carefully between legitimacy 
and trust.  More positively, legality and shared values appear to be two 
conceptually foundational elements of audience legitimacy, and creative 
reflection on that fact should open up fresh approaches to the measurement 
of audience legitimacy. 
Recently, one of us met a chief police officer from a police service 
outside our own jurisdiction.  He was impressed by the procedural justice 
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literature, which he had communicated to his officers and which had 
undoubtedly been valuable in developing operational policing in the area 
for which he carries executive responsibility.  Nevertheless, he commented, 
the procedural justice literature offered him only limited guidance as to how 
best to adapt police strategies and training in a fast-changing and 
increasingly cosmopolitan world, where the legitimacy of his force seemed 
open to more frequent challenges than in the past.  We agree with his 
assessment, and we hope that this Article might make a contribution to what 
seems likely to be an increasingly important debate. 
